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ABSTRACT
As presidents make ever more expansive claims of executive power,
Congress’s ability and willingness to counter the executive is often
limited. That makes all the more significant instances when Congress
does overcome structural and political challenges to pass legislation to
rein in the president. But thanks to the Supreme Court’s invalidation of
legislative vetoes in INS v. Chadha, such congressional actions are
necessarily subject to presidential veto. President Donald Trump, for
example, vetoed joint resolutions aimed at restraining executive action
relating to the border wall and war powers. Although vetoed bills are
not binding law, this Article argues that neither are they legal nullities;
instead, judges, executive branch lawyers, and other interpreters can
use majoritarian congressional opposition to the executive as an
interpretive tool. The result is a novel “Youngstown canon of
construction”: when Congress passes a bill or resolution by a majority
of both houses and the president exercises the veto, preventing the act
from becoming law, then the expressed congressional opposition to the
president’s view should be used to narrowly construe the underlying
statutory or constitutional authority the president is claiming, if that
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authority is ambiguous. The proposed canon would help to counteract
overbroad claims of executive power in important areas such as war
powers, the National Emergencies Act, treaty termination, and the
scope of federal preemption of state laws.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress can’t agree on much these days, and it’s no secret that
the legislature often has trouble reining in a determined president. But
sometimes, at least, it tries. In several recent instances, Congress
passed resolutions aimed at restraining the Trump administration.
President Donald Trump, however, vetoed Congress’s efforts. He
issued the first veto of his presidency to defeat a joint resolution that
would have terminated the national emergency he declared to pave the

EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

THE YOUNGSTOWN CANON

2/23/2021 9:06 PM

1247

way for constructing a border wall.1 He vetoed another joint resolution
directing the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from hostilities in
Yemen,2 and yet another directing termination of hostilities with Iran
in the wake of the killing of Major General Qassem Soleimani.3
In litigation over the border wall, the Trump administration
argued that “Congress’s failed attempt to override the President’s veto
of its disapproval of the national emergency declaration does not have
the force of law or in any way restrict authority Congress previously
granted to the Executive.”4 The first part of that sentence is correct as
a matter of Supreme Court precedent. Legislative acts usually become
binding law only if they are passed by majorities of both houses of
Congress and signed into law by the president, or enacted by a
supermajority of Congress after a presidential veto.5 The vetoed joint
resolutions were not. But is it really true that they cannot in any way
cabin the executive?
This Article argues that in certain cases, courts, executive branch
lawyers, and other interpreters can and should consider vetoed bills
when construing the scope of presidential powers.6 It proposes a
Youngstown canon of construction, drawing inspiration from the
insight in Justice Robert Jackson’s Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case)7 concurrence that “[p]residential
powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or
conjunction with those of Congress.”8 The Youngstown canon would
instruct that when Congress passes a bill or resolution by a majority of
both houses and the president vetoes it, then the expressed
1. See infra notes 242–55 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 199–207 and accompanying text.
3. Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval Legislation To Terminate the Use
of United States Armed Forces in Hostilities Against Iran, 2020 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (May
6, 2020) [hereinafter Iran Veto]; see also S.J. Res. 68, 116th Cong. § 2(a) (2020) (directing the
termination of use of U.S. forces for hostilities with Iran).
4. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 27–28, Sierra
Club v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 883 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-00892).
5. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“If any Bill shall
not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been
presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the
Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.”).
6. This Article builds upon ideas I first set out in a blog post. Kristen Eichensehr, What To
Do with Vetoed Bills, JUST SEC. (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63380/what-to-dowith-vetoed-bills [https://perma.cc/2NYQ-6EZR].
7. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
8. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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congressional opposition to the president’s view should be used to
narrowly construe the underlying statutory or constitutional authority
the president is claiming if that authority is ambiguous.9 Using
Youngstown as a canon of construction provides a way to account for
congressional opposition to exercises of presidential power while also
complying with the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha,10
which held that legislative acts that do not comply with bicameralism
and presentment cannot be legally binding.11 The canon steers a middle
course between treating vetoed bills as legal nullities and equating
them with enacted statutes. It instructs that these bills are legally
relevant as an input into statutory or constitutional construction
without being legally binding.
Congress’s attempts to restrain the Trump administration bring to
the fore a larger problem: over the course of decades, the executive
branch has accumulated power in ways that deviate from the allocation
of authority that the Constitution envisions and contravene Congress’s
intent in coupling statutory delegations with legislative checks, later
invalidated by the Supreme Court. Trump was not the first president
to make expansive claims of executive power, and he won’t be the last.
The Youngstown canon can help to recalibrate the balance of power in
Congress’s favor and gird against future executive excesses.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I defines and explains
the Youngstown canon and offers four normative justifications for its
use. Part II explores the canon’s practical application through several
illustrative examples drawn from actual and hypothetical cases,
including war powers, the National Emergencies Act (“NEA”),
congressional action to block treaty termination, and the scope of
federal preemption. Part III considers several likely concerns with the
Youngstown canon and speculates about the possible consequences of
its adoption.

9. I use “ambiguity” throughout this Article in the general sense often employed by courts
and commentators to denote various forms of indeterminacy and uncertainty. See Lawrence B.
Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 97 (2010)
(explaining that “[i]n ordinary speech, . . . vagueness and ambiguity . . . are sometimes used
interchangeably, and, when this is the case, they both mark a general lack of what we might call
‘determinacy’ (or ‘clarity’ or ‘certainty’) of meaning”).
10. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
11. Id. at 951.
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I. YOUNGSTOWN AS A CANON
The Youngstown canon both draws inspiration from Justice
Jackson’s iconic concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case) and sheds light on how best to apply
it.12 This Part reviews the Youngstown decision, defines and situates the
Youngstown canon, and offers several justifications for the canon’s use.
A. Youngstown and Congressional Opposition
In the midst of the Korean War and a labor dispute between steel
workers and mill owners, President Harry Truman issued an executive
order directing the secretary of commerce to seize control of U.S. steel
mills to avert a work stoppage.13 The mill owners, including
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., sued, and in an opinion by Justice
Hugo Black, the Court held the president’s order unconstitutional.14
Over time, Jackson’s concurring opinion has come to overshadow
the majority.15 Drawing on his prior experience as an executive branch
12. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring); see infra Part I.C.4 (discussing
how the canon clarifies the application of Jackson’s tripartite Youngstown framework). Scholars
of a more formalist or originalist bent have objected to Jackson’s approach. See, e.g., Robert J.
Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority To Conduct Military
Operations Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor or Support Them, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487, 512–13 (2002) (noting that they “do not believe that Justice
Jackson’s approach in Youngstown accurately captures the separation of powers”); Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, Zivotofsky and the Separation of Powers, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 29–30
(critiquing Jackson’s three-part framework on a variety of grounds, including that it is “quite
vacuous” and “something of a doctrinal Rorschach test”). For purposes of this Article, I take as
a given the conventional wisdom about the importance of Jackson’s opinion to separation of
powers jurisprudence. See infra note 15 (collecting sources).
13. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582–84.
14. Id. at 587, 589.
15. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
94 (2d ed. 1996) (calling Jackson’s opinion “a starting point for constitutional discussion of
concurrent powers”); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over
International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1257 (2018) (calling Jackson’s framework
“canonical”); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2314 (2006) (calling Jackson’s Youngstown opinion “the most celebrated
judicial opinion of the separation-of-powers canon”); Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy
of Youngstown, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 266 (2010) (calling Jackson’s tripartite framework
“Youngstown’s enduring legacy”); id. at 269–70 (collecting quotations praising Jackson’s
opinion); see also Kristen E. Eichensehr, Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations,
85 U. CHI. L. REV. 609, 619–20 (2018) [hereinafter Eichensehr, Conduct of Foreign Relations]
(noting that nineteen Supreme Court majority opinions, numerous Supreme Court separate
opinions, and dozens of Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) opinions had cited Jackson’s
concurrence through early 2018). Through the end of the Supreme Court’s 2019 term in summer
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lawyer,16 Jackson noted “the poverty of really useful and unambiguous
authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they
actually present themselves.”17 And he set out to create some.18
Jackson described a tripartite framework for evaluating claims of
executive power. In Category One, “the President acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress,” and “his authority is at
its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus
all that Congress can delegate.”19 In Category Two, “the President acts
in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority,” and
he is therefore in a “zone of twilight” where the executive and
Congress “may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution
is uncertain.”20 In Category Two, “congressional inertia, indifference
or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if
not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.”21
Finally, in Category Three, “the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,”22 and
therefore, “his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon
his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
2020, the statistic on citations to Jackson in majority opinions remains unchanged, but the opinion
has garnered additional citations in significant separate opinions. See Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 140
S. Ct. 2183, 2245 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Jackson’s concurrence); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2137 n.42 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (same).
16. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing his prior experience as a
“legal adviser to a President in time of transition and public anxiety”); see also id. at 647 (“[A]
judge cannot accept self-serving press statements of the attorney for one of the interested parties
as authority in answering a constitutional question, even if the advocate was himself.”).
17. Id. at 634.
18. The frequency with which courts and commentators cite Jackson’s opinion suggests that
he succeeded, at least in creating a useful framework. Whether it is unambiguous is a separate
matter.
19. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 637.
21. Id. Jackson provides by far the least detail about the likely legal outcome with respect to
Category Two. Instead of suggesting which way power leans, he notes “any actual test of power
is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law.” Id. Commentators have rightly criticized the ambiguity inherent in
Jackson’s Category Two. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from
Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 603 (2008) (“[T]he soft law analytic frame makes
clear that Justice Jackson’s typology is actually incomplete. Speaking of congressional agreement,
disapproval, or silence is unnecessarily crude. The House might authorize the presidential action
and the Senate might expressly disavow it (or vice versa), creating a twilight of the twilight
category.”).
22. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Congress over the matter.”23 Courts can uphold “exclusive Presidential
control” in Category Three “only by disabling the Congress from
acting upon the subject,” and executive actions in this category,
Jackson warned, “must be scrutinized with caution.”24 Although the
tripartite framework is, as Jackson himself recognized, “oversimplified,”25 it nonetheless provides a useful structure for
understanding the separation of powers.
The framework’s central insight is that “[p]residential powers are
not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or
conjunction with those of Congress.”26 Key to applying the framework
and defining the scope of presidential powers is understanding what
counts as congressional action relevant to the Youngstown analysis.
Jackson spoke of congressional authorization, “congressional grant or
denial of authority,” and Congress’s “express or implied will.”27 The
most authoritative expressions of congressional views are undoubtedly
those contained in enacted laws or ratified treaties, granting or
delegating authority to the executive to act or prohibiting specific
actions. But Jackson went further, contemplating implied
authorization or the implied will of Congress as well.28 Youngstown
itself involved an implied prohibition by Congress. Three statutory
schemes could potentially have allowed Truman to control the seized
steel mills,29 but Truman did not follow any of the available statutory
options.30 Instead, “[i]n choosing a different and inconsistent way of his
own,”31 the president fell into Category Three.32 Still, in determining
the implied will of Congress, Jackson extrapolated from enacted
statutes, reasoning in a matter akin to the expressio unius est exclusio

23. Id.
24. Id. at 637–38.
25. Id. at 635.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 637.
28. Cf. Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 123, 188 (1994) (“Youngstown recognized what Chadha failed to recognize:
Congress’s ‘voice’ matters regarding the nature and scope of presidential power, and to hear that
voice one must sometimes go beyond enacted authorizations or prohibitions.”).
29. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing statutes).
30. Id.
31. Id. Indeed, as the majority opinion points out, Congress had considered and rejected a
proposal to give the president authority to use governmental seizures “to solve labor disputes in
order to prevent work stoppages.” Id. at 586 (majority opinion).
32. Id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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alterius canon of statutory construction that Congress’s approval of
certain seizure mechanisms suggested its disapproval of others.33
Decades after Youngstown, the Supreme Court entrenched
enacted statutes as the nearly exclusive means by which Congress could
act with binding legal effect.34 In Chadha, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a one-house legislative veto35—one
of hundreds of similar provisions that Congress had enacted in the
twentieth century.36 The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
gave the attorney general discretion to suspend the deportation and
adjust the status of deportable aliens in the United States to lawful
permanent residents, pursuant to certain conditions.37 However, the
INA specified that if either house of Congress passed a resolution
disapproving “the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney
General shall thereupon deport such alien.”38 Jagdish Rai Chadha was
a deportable alien for whom an immigration judge and the attorney
general recommended suspension of deportation.39 The House passed
a resolution of disapproval,40 and the immigration judge reopened
deportation proceedings.41 Chadha challenged the constitutionality of
the one-house legislative veto,42 and ultimately, the Supreme Court
agreed that the provision was unconstitutional.43
In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court
explained that “the prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7
represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the
Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely
33. Id. at 639; 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (7th ed. 2014) (“Expressio unius instructs that, where a
statute designates a form of conduct, the manner of its performance and operation, and the
persons and things to which it refers, courts should infer that all omissions were intentional
exclusions.” (footnotes omitted)).
34. Senate approvals of treaties, which are governed by the procedures set out in Article II,
remain unaffected by the Chadha analysis.
35. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923 (1983).
36. See id. at 944–45 (noting that the first legislative veto was enacted in 1932 and that 295
such provisions had been enacted overall).
37. Id. at 923–25 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 244(a)(1), (c)(1)–(c)(2),
8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1), (c)(1)–(2) (1970)).
38. Id. at 925 (quoting INA § 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2)).
39. Id. at 923–25.
40. Id. at 926–27.
41. Id. at 928.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.”44 Congress cannot
exercise legislative power except by complying with the bicameralism
and presentment requirements set out in Article I.45 The Court
recognized that “[n]ot every action taken by either House is subject to
the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I,”46 but
established a presumption that acts by Congress are legislative acts, a
presumption confirmed by the one-house resolution at issue.47 The
one-house resolution “was essentially legislative in purpose and effect”
because it purported to “alter[] the legal rights, duties and relations of
persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials
and Chadha, all outside the legislative branch.”48 Moreover, “[t]he
legislative character of the one-House veto” was “confirmed by the
character of the Congressional action it supplants”: without the onehouse veto, Congress would have had to pass legislation to alter
Chadha’s status.49 The Court soundly rejected “utilitarian” arguments
that the usefulness of the legislative veto provision should save it from
unconstitutionality.50
The abiding lesson of Chadha is that legislative acts must conform
to the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I, and,
conversely, that attempted legislative acts that fall short of the Article
I requirements cannot be treated as binding law. For the purposes of
the Youngstown analysis, Chadha suggests that in most cases, what
counts as congressional action is perfected legislative action—those
actions that comply with Article I—and clear implications from
enacted statutes, as evidenced by Youngstown itself.
Chadha was enormously disruptive to a number of existing
statutory schemes. As the Court itself noted, and Justice Byron White
emphasized in dissent,51 Congress had used the Article I process to
enact numerous delegations of power to the executive on the condition

44. Id. at 951.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 952.
47. Id. at 951–52.
48. Id. at 952.
49. Id. at 952–54.
50. Id. at 945.
51. Id. at 944–45; id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting) (“[O]ver the past five decades, the
legislative veto has been placed in nearly 200 statutes . . . in every field of governmental concern:
reorganization, budgets, foreign affairs, war powers, and regulation of trade, safety, energy, the
environment, and the economy.” (footnote omitted)).
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that the delegations were subject to legislative vetoes—ways for
Congress to pull back power through mechanisms that were not subject
to the presidential veto. Although Chadha itself dealt only with a onehouse legislative veto, the Court’s reasoning strongly suggests that
other sorts of legislative vetoes, including two-house legislative vetoes,
are similarly impermissible.52
Enter the Youngstown canon.
B. Defining and Situating the Youngstown Canon
Canons of construction are judicially created principles that courts
and other interpreters use to construe legal texts.53 Scholars often
group canons into three categories: textual, substantive, and extrinsic.54
Textual canons are “inferences that are usually drawn from the
drafter’s choice of words, their grammatical placement in sentences,
and their relationship to other parts of the statute.”55 Textual canons
include maxims such as ejusdem generis56 and the rule against

52. Chadha formally involved a one-house negative legislative veto—that is, the statute
“allow[ed] policy to be implemented unless Congress disapproves.” Gersen & Posner, supra note
21, at 583. Nonetheless, its reasoning reached more broadly. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 523–24 (1992) (noting that
Chadha’s “reasoning suggested the constitutional invalidity of two-house legislative vetoes and of
legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking”); Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 583 (noting that the
Supreme Court’s “reasoning clearly suggested that the positive legislative or two-house veto
would be unconstitutional as well”).
53. See, e.g., ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 114 (2d ed. 2002)
(“Canons of construction are judicially crafted maxims or aphorisms for determining the meaning
of statutes.”); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901, 905 (2013) (describing canons as “the default presumptions that judges apply to
interpret ambiguous statutes”).
54. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ABBE R. GLUCK & VICTORIA F. NOURSE,
STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN
THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 448–49 (2014) (describing the three categories); Gluck & Bressman,
supra note 53, at 924–25 (describing the three categories); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering
Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 833 (2017) (describing “language canons and
substantive canons”).
55. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 54, at 448.
56. See 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 33,
§ 47:17 (defining the canon to mean that “where general words follow specific words in an
enumeration describing a statute’s legal subject, the general words are construed to embrace only
objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words” (footnotes
omitted)).
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surplusage.57 Substantive canons are “presumptions about statutory
meaning based upon substantive principles or policies drawn from the
common law, other statutes, or the Constitution,”58 and they include
well-known canons such as the rule of lenity and constitutional
avoidance.59 Extrinsic canons or “extrinsic aids . . . are presumptive
rules telling the interpreter what other materials might be consulted to
figure out what the statute means,” including, most prominently,
legislative history.60
The proposed Youngstown canon falls in the second category. It is
a substantive canon that provides a way to account for congressional
opposition to presidential exercises of power when a presidential veto
stymies Congress from perfecting its opposition. The Youngstown
canon can be stated as follows:
When Congress passes a bill or resolution by a majority of both
houses and the president exercises the veto, preventing the act from
becoming law, then the expressed congressional opposition to the
president’s view should be used to narrowly construe the underlying
statutory or constitutional authority the president is claiming if that
authority is ambiguous.61

The Youngstown canon provides a way to account for congressional
opposition to the president when constitutional or statutory authorities
are ambiguous, but importantly, the canon is consistent with Chadha.
The canon does not purport to give binding legal effect to bills passed
by both houses of Congress but vetoed by the president, which Chadha
would prohibit.62 It respects the constitutional presentment
requirement by maintaining a distinction between enacted laws, which
have binding legal effect, and vetoed bills, which do not.63 But the
57. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 54, at 467 (describing the “presumption . . . that every
word and phrase adds something to the statutory command” and that “[a] construction that would
leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected”).
58. Id. at 448.
59. See, e.g., Krishnakumar, supra note 54, at 833–35 (citing these and other examples of
substantive canons).
60. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 54, at 448–49.
61. See supra note 9 for the meaning of “ambiguity.”
62. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“It emerges clearly that the prescription for
legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7, represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative power of
the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure.”).
63. Cf. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 598 (identifying a “rule-of-law objection” or, some
might say, formalist objection to using concurrent resolutions for interpretation on the grounds
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canon suggests that vetoed bills can be one input into constructions of
executive power and thereby have legal influence. In other words, the
canon does not allow Congress to make law without the president, but
it does ensure that Congress’s views can be taken into account, at least
when the existence or scope of the underlying authority for the
president’s action is ambiguous.
Not all vetoed bills have constitutional salience. Some bills and
subsequent vetoes rest on pure policy disagreements, having nothing
to do with the separation of powers.64 Imagine, for example, that
Congress passes a bill to raise taxes, and a president who campaigned
on a no-new-taxes platform vetoes the tax hike.65 Other vetoes,
however, involve constitutional conflicts.66 Consider, for example,
vetoes asserting that Congress has infringed upon the executive’s war
powers,67 power to conduct foreign relations,68 or vetoes preventing

that “[i]f Congress can regulate with soft statutes, then the constitutional requirement of
presentment is rendered void and the President’s role in producing legislation is eliminated”).
64. See, e.g., Memorandum of Disapproval on the “Interstate Recognition of Notarizations
Act of 2010,” 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Oct. 8, 2010) (citing the need for “further
deliberations about the possible unintended impact of H.R. 3808 . . . on consumer protections,
including those for mortgages, before the bill can be finalized,” noting that “[t]he authors of this
bill no doubt had the best intentions in mind when trying to remove impediments to interstate
commerce,” and stating that the Obama administration “will work with them and other leaders
in Congress to explore the best ways to achieve this goal going forward”).
65. Cf. Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Tax
Fairness and Economic Growth Acceleration Act of 1992, 1 PUB. PAPERS 476, 477 (Mar. 20, 1992)
(explaining the veto on the ground of policy disagreements with tax increases including that “[t]his
is the wrong time to raise taxes, to increase the deficit, or to send a message of fiscal
irresponsibility to financial markets”). One could argue that the Youngstown canon should apply
even in such purely policy-based veto scenarios, but the justifications for considering the views of
the later Congress on an existing statutory authority in such a case are, in my opinion, more
subject to the criticisms associated with looking to subsequent legislative history. See infra notes
130–32 and accompanying text.
66. I use “involve” here rather than “assert” because the relevance of the Youngstown canon
should not depend on whether the president overtly cites constitutional objections in a veto
message. To put it another way, presidents should not be able to prevent application of the
Youngstown canon in constitutional disputes with Congress merely by avoiding citations to
constitutional authorities in their veto messages. This concern is largely hypothetical as presidents
are not shy about claiming that Article II supports their vetoes, see, e.g., infra notes 67–68, but it
is worth flagging that the canon should not be so easily gamed or defeated.
67. See, e.g., Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 1 PUB. PAPERS 893 (Oct. 24, 1973) (raising
objections to the War Powers Resolution); infra notes 199–207 and accompanying text (discussing
the veto of a war powers-related resolution).
68. See, e.g., Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1567–68 (Nov.
21, 1989) (objecting to statutory provisions that “threaten[] to subject to criminal investigation a
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revisions to the scope of authority that Congress previously delegated
to the president.69 The Youngstown canon has the most force in these
sorts of conflicts. In separation of powers disputes, the majoritarian
actions of Congress have constitutional relevance. With the president’s
agreement or sufficient votes to override a veto, such actions set
binding law. But even when they don’t result in binding law, the
Youngstown canon affords them interpretive relevance.
Judges use substantive canons, sometimes even the same
substantive canon, in different ways. Judges may deploy a substantive
canon “as a starting point for discussion, a balancing factor, or a
decisive tiebreaker at the end of a discussion.”70 The Youngstown
canon preserves this flexibility, allowing judges to tailor their
application of the canon to their interpretive preferences and to the
context of particular cases. A judge might cite the canon as a
background principle to frame discussion of the level of deference due
to the executive on claims about national security, and as a reason to
curb such deference.71 Consider, for example, litigation about the
Trump administration’s construction of the border wall that asks
whether there is a national emergency that “requires the use of the
armed forces” or whether constructing a border wall is a “military
requirement.”72 Alternatively, a judge or other interpreter might reach
for the Youngstown canon as a tiebreaker at the end of the analysis and
use the canon to justify ruling against the executive only if ambiguity
about the existence or scope of the executive’s authority remains after
exhausting other, traditional tools of statutory construction. For

wide range of entirely legitimate diplomatic activity, the authority and responsibility for which is
vested in the executive branch by the Constitution”).
69. See, e.g., infra notes 242–55 and accompanying text (discussing the veto of a national
emergency-related resolution).
70. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 54, at 492. For an example of differing applications of the
same canon, compare Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998) (describing the rule
of lenity effectively as a tiebreaker that “applies only if, ‘after seizing everything from which aid
can be derived,’ . . . we can make ‘no more than a guess as to what Congress intended’” (quoting
United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997)), with id. at 148 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(describing the rule of lenity in terms approaching a presumption against the government in
criminal cases).
71. As will become clear in the applications of the canon discussed in Part II, many
separation-of-powers disputes involve foreign relations or national security, areas in which judges
often afford the executive considerable deference based on expertise and other rationales. See
generally Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009)
(discussing “national security fact deference” to the executive).
72. See infra Part II.B.
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example, imagine a case in which the president argues that the Senate’s
prior consent to ratification of a treaty that includes a termination
clause impliedly authorizes the president to terminate that treaty
unilaterally, despite a later attempt by Congress to forbid the president
from terminating the very same treaty. Courts might deploy the
Youngstown canon there to rule against the president’s claim that the
treaty’s termination clause impliedly authorizes his actions and puts
him in Youngstown Category One, and instead determine that the case
must be decided in Youngstown Category Two.73
The Youngstown canon can also interact with other canons,
especially constitutional avoidance. Consider a case in which the
executive argues that Congress has acquiesced in a claim of executive
power. But Congress has passed and the president has vetoed bills that
would have reined in executive action. Judges or other interpreters
could cite the Youngstown canon for the proposition that the vetoed
bills show that Congress has not acquiesced in the executive’s broad
claim.74 Consideration of vetoed bills and Congress’s nonacquiescence
would raise questions about the constitutionality of the president’s
claim to power. Such questions in turn would trigger the canon of
constitutional avoidance: “[W]here an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems,
the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”75

73. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see infra Part II.C.
74. For a detailed discussion of how the Youngstown canon interacts with historical gloss and
claims of acquiescence, see infra notes 168–79 and accompanying text.
75. Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997) (terming this
“modern avoidance”); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 54, at 517 (explaining that “[u]nder
modern avoidance, the court does not actually decide the constitutional question before moving
to an alternative interpretation,” but instead “flags a potential constitutional question and so
moves to an alternative interpretation to avoid having to address it”).
The modern version of constitutional avoidance “supplanted” “classical avoidance,” which
requires that “as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be
unconstitutional and by the other valid, [the Court’s] plain duty is to adopt that which will save
the Act.” Vermeule, supra (alteration in original) (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148
(1927) (Holmes, J., concurring)). As Professor Adrian Vermeule explains, “[t]he basic difference
between classical and modern avoidance is that the former requires the court to determine that
one plausible interpretation of the statute would be unconstitutional, while the latter requires
only a determination that one plausible reading might be unconstitutional.” Id. The Youngstown
canon and constitutional avoidance are similar in structure; both are “tool[s] for managing
statutory ambiguity” that “do[] not eliminate ambiguity by resolving uncertainty about statutory
meaning,” but rather “manage[] ambiguity by assigning a consequence to the uncertainty.”
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The Youngstown canon could perhaps interact with constitutional
avoidance in another way as well. When Congress has restrained the
executive by statute, the executive may attempt to deploy
constitutional avoidance in a “self-protective” way by “fabricating
statutory ambiguity and exaggerating constitutional concerns” to
trigger the canon of constitutional avoidance and justify narrowly
construing the statutory restriction on executive power.76 If Congress
has successfully enacted one restriction on the executive and then the
president vetoes congressional attempts to tighten the restriction
further, the same ambiguity that the executive would have to cite to
trigger constitutional avoidance would similarly trigger the
Youngstown canon, and, along with it, the need to consider Congress’s
expressed opposition to the president’s view. In this way, the
Youngstown canon could help to counteract executive abuse of
constitutional avoidance in circumstances where Congress has
repeatedly attempted to limit executive power.
Importantly, judges are not the only interpreters who use canons.
Congress knowingly drafts in the shadow of at least some canons,77 and
executive branch lawyers also deploy canons of construction.78 In some
cases, executive branch lawyers use canons in anticipation of litigation;
if the United States will have to defend its constitutional or statutory
interpretation in court, then it behooves executive branch lawyers to
advise their clients on how judges are likely to view the interpretive
question.79 At the same time, many executive branch constitutional and
Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1189, 1240 (2006) (emphasis omitted).
76. Morrison, supra note 75, at 1236.
77. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 53, at 906–08 (summarizing canons that Congress
knows and does not know).
78. See, e.g., Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal
Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Att’ys of the Off. of the Assistant Att’y Gen., Re: Best Practices
for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions 2 (July 16, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf [https://perma.cc/G34K-LQ7D]
(explaining that, with respect to statutory interpretation, “OLC’s analysis should be guided by the
texts of the relevant documents, and should use traditional tools of construction in interpreting
those texts”); Morrison, supra note 75, at 1218–19 (“The [constitutional] avoidance canon appears
frequently in OLC opinions; like the courts, OLC tends to regard it as a ‘settled’ rule.” (quoting
Limitations on the Detention Auth. of the Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 27 Op. O.L.C. 58, 61
(2003))).
79. Cf. Morrison, supra note 75, at 1197 (arguing that when an agency knows that its
statutory construction “will likely face judicial review, and if the reviewing court would
predictably use a particular canon when construing the statute, then the agency has a tactical
incentive to apply the canon even if the values supporting it apply only to the judiciary”).
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statutory interpretations are not subject to judicial review because of
issues of justiciability and standing, among others.80 In such cases,
executive branch lawyers still have an independent duty to construe
legal authorities accurately, and perhaps even a heightened duty of
care because of the absence of independent judicial review.81 Thus, to
the extent that particular canons facilitate reaching the best or most
accurate understanding of legal authorities, executive branch lawyers
should use them, even in instances where judicial review is unlikely or
impossible.
The proposed Youngstown canon is novel, but it is not unmoored
from existing interpretive practice. As defined above, the Youngstown
canon follows a well-trodden path of substantive canons that direct
broad or narrow construction of statutes.82
Using ambiguity as the trigger for applying the Youngstown canon
is in line with other constitutionally inflected substantive canons,83 such
as the principle of constitutional avoidance and the rule of lenity.84
80. Id. (noting that this is particularly true “[i]n matters implicating foreign affairs and
national security” where “judicial review of executive branch statutory interpretation is extremely
infrequent”).
81. Cf. The Const. Separation of Powers Between the President and Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C.
124, 180 (1996) (explaining that where judicial review is unavailable or deferential “the executive
branch’s regular obligation to ensure, to the full extent of its ability, that constitutional
requirements are respected is heightened by the absence or reduced presence of the courts’
ordinary guardianship of the Constitution’s requirements”); Morrison, supra note 75, at 1224
(“[T]he fact that the courts have essentially no role in implementing certain provisions of the
Constitution does not license the executive branch to ignore those provisions. Instead, executive
officials have a duty to abide by their own best understanding of the provisions.”).
82. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 54, at 490–91 (explaining that “[t]raditionally, the main
substantive canons were directives to interpret different types of statutes ‘liberally’ or ‘strictly,’”
and citing the examples that “statutes in derogation of the common law were to be strictly
interpreted,” as are criminal statutes, per the rule of lenity). Substantive canons can also be
phrased, however, as rebuttable presumptions or even as clear statement rules—“presumptions
that can only be rebutted by express language in the text of the statute.” Id. at 492–93. And
through court decisions, canons sometimes evolve from one framing to another. Id. at 493 (noting
“some mobility in the Court’s articulation of these substantive canons” and citing the example of
the transformation of the presumption against extraterritoriality from a presumption into a clear
statement rule).
83. Of course, there exists some ambiguity about ambiguity. See generally Richard M. Re,
Clarity Doctrines, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1497 (2019) (discussing the role of ambiguity and its
counterpart, legal clarity).
84. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 562 (2012) (“[I]t is well
established that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitution,
courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so.”). Ambiguity is also the trigger for the rule
of lenity. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 410 (2010) (discussing “the familiar
principle that ‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of
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Ambiguity is also the trigger for federalism canons,85 which are not only
substantive canons, but also, like the Youngstown canon, address
structural constitutional issues, albeit ones focused on the allocation of
power between the federal government and the states instead of among
branches of the federal government.86
Giving interpretive effect to actions of Congress short of enacted
legislation is not unique to this proposed canon.87 Consider, for
example, the interpretive principle known as the rejected proposal
rule.88 Pursuant to this principle, courts are reluctant to give a statute a
meaning that Congress as a whole or even a congressional committee

lenity’” (quoting Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000))). The rule of lenity is often
explained as grounded in due process, specifically the need to put the public on fair notice of
conduct that will be considered criminal. See, e.g., McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)
(applying the rule of lenity to narrowly construe a statute and explaining that “[a]lthough it is not
likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals,”
nonetheless “a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed”).
85. See Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 859–60 (2014) (specifying that “it is appropriate
to refer to basic principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve ambiguity in a
federal statute,” and explaining that “[i]n this case, the ambiguity derives from the improbably
broad reach of the key statutory definition given the term—‘chemical weapon’—being defined”
and “the deeply serious consequences of adopting such a boundless reading” before narrowly
construing the statutory term); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991) (using ambiguity as
the trigger for the federalism canon).
86. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000) (arguing
that the nondelegation doctrine has persisted in “nondelegation canons” that “forbid
administrative agencies from making decisions on their own” and instead require affirmative
action by Congress).
87. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 631 (1992) (suggesting that
the Supreme Court uses interpretive canons to “articulate and protect underenforced
constitutional norms,” including the separation of powers).
88. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600–01 (1983) (reasoning that
although “[o]rdinarily, and quite appropriately, courts are slow to attribute significance to the
failure of Congress to act on particular legislation,” here, “[i]n view of its prolonged and acute
awareness of so important an issue, Congress’ failure to act on the bills proposed on this subject
provides added support for concluding that Congress acquiesced in [the agency interpretation at
issue]”); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972) (recounting how Congress, “with full and
continuing . . . awareness,” allowed baseball “to develop and to expand unhindered by federal
legislative action” to subject it to antitrust laws over the course of decades and concluding that
Congress’s failure to pass “[r]emedial legislation [that] has been introduced repeatedly”
constitutes “something other than mere congressional silence and passivity”); see also Abbe R.
Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of
Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 77 n.90 (2015) (“The Court has long applied a
‘rejected proposal rule,’ under which it refuses to construe statutes to incorporate provisions that
Congress has expressly rejected.”).
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has considered and rejected.89 When courts rely on the rejected
proposal rule, they give interpretive weight to proposed bills and
amendments that Congress failed to adopt. If even congressional
inaction and, as the rule’s name suggests, rejected proposals are
relevant interpretive guides in some circumstances, then logically
accepted proposals—congressional action by a majority vote of both
houses—should also be a relevant and even a superior guide to
congressional intent.90 The Youngstown canon relies on congressional
action, not congressional disavowal or mere inaction. Short of
overriding a veto, Congress cannot communicate its views any more
clearly.
In addition, the Supreme Court looks to congressional actions
short of enacted legislation when interpreting ambiguous
constitutional provisions. For example, in National Labor Relations
Board v. Noel Canning,91 the Court considered the meaning of the
Constitution’s Recess Appointments Clause.92 The Court determined
that the Constitution’s text was ambiguous with respect to whether
presidents may make recess appointments during intrasession recesses
and whether they may make recess appointments for vacancies that

89. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67,
85 (1988) (describing the rejected proposal rule and noting “[w]here a committee, or one chamber
of Congress, or a conference committee has voted against including specific language in a statute
or an amendment to a statute, the Court will often refuse to read that interpretation into the
statute”).
Some rejected proposals may share similarities with vetoed bills. Consider a proposal
discussed on the floor of both houses and voted down by a majority of each house. Such a
circumstance shares a majoritarian aspect with the vetoed bill, albeit majoritarian opposition to
action as well as bicameralism in a sense. Such characteristics might make courts and other
interpreters give particular weight to the rejected proposal rule because it would be clear that the
rejection resulted from significant congressional opposition, rather than some sort of preliminary
vetogate. The rejected proposal rule and Youngstown canon could also apply together if, for
example, the president sought statutory authorization from Congress, a majority of each house
voted down the authorization, the president claimed authority from preexisting statutes, and then
Congress attempted to rein in the president, provoking a veto. Both canons would operate to
suggest the underlying statutory authority should be narrowly construed if, as seems likely, the
existing authority is ambiguous.
90. Cf. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 610 (arguing that “if subsequent congressional
silence . . . is ever relevant for statutory interpretation, surely congressional voice (in the form of
soft statutes) should be as well” because while “Congress may not always have an incentive to
express its views candidly, . . . there is no reason to think that voice approved by a majority will
be usually less reliable than silence” (footnotes omitted)).
91. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014).
92. Id. at 518–19.
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begin prior to a recess.93 Given the textual ambiguity, the Court “put
significant weight upon historical practice,”94 including actions of
Congress. Among the congressional actions the Court considered were
those by Senate committees—that is, actions clearly lacking the status
of law or even the majoritarian aspect required for consideration of
congressional action pursuant to the Youngstown canon.95
The proposed Youngstown canon is also consistent with scholarly
proposals to give weight to congressional “soft law.”96 Soft law occurs
in a variety of contexts,97 but Professors Jacob Gersen and Eric Posner
93. Id. at 556 (“[T]he Clause’s text, standing alone, is ambiguous. It does not resolve whether
the President may make appointments during intra-session recesses, or whether he may fill prerecess vacancies.”).
94. Id. at 524 (emphasis omitted).
95. See id. at 530–32 (discussing a Senate Judiciary Committee Report for the meaning of
“recess” in the Constitution as including both intersession and intrasession recesses); id. at 547
(discussing a Senate Judiciary Committee Report regarding whether the Recess Appointments
Clause permits presidential appointments to vacancies that begin prior to a recess); see also id. at
531 (“[N]either the Senate considered as a body nor its committees, despite opportunities to
express opposition to the practice of intra-session recess appointments, has done so.”); Curtis A.
Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional
Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 66 n.273 (arguing that “[t]he majority in Noel Canning
may have given a nudge to the consideration of soft law in” referring to the practice of Senate
committees in interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause).
96. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 612 (“A soft statute purporting to clarify the meaning
of an earlier hard statute should not control if the text of the earlier statute is clear. In a case of
statutory ambiguity however, a soft statute should be given weight.”). See generally Josh
Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (2012) (discussing congressional soft
powers alongside the legislature’s hard powers). In a related vein, Professor Abner S. Greene has
proposed “[r]evising Chadha” such that, under certain circumstances, concurrent resolutions
would be sufficient to block presidential actions. Greene, supra note 28, at 187, 193–95.
My proposed Youngstown canon differs from Greene’s proposal in several ways. First, I
focus primarily on constitutional questions, whereas he focuses in large part on statutory
delegations. See id. at 193 (noting that he is “chiefly concerned” with “Rust-type case[s],” which
involve a statutory delegation, though his “analysis applies . . . by analogy to the Youngstowntype case as well”). Second, his proposal is, as he concedes, not consistent with Chadha because
it would give binding effect to certain concurrent resolutions. See id. at 187 (discussing “[r]evising
Chadha”); id. at 195 (summarizing his proposal as follows: “If the President (or any executive
agency) promulgates a regulation pursuant to a law that neither expressly authorizes presidential
resolution of the particular issue nor clearly resolves the issue as a matter of antecedent
congressional intent, a subsequent concurrent resolution should be construed as sufficient to
block the regulation”). By contrast, my proposal is consistent with Chadha because it argues not
for giving binding legal effect to congressional actions short of enacted law, but only for using
such actions as one input into the process of interpreting certain constitutional or statutory
provisions. In other words, vetoed bills can have legal influence, despite the fact that they do not
have binding legal effect.
97. For discussions of soft law in the international and foreign relations law contexts, for
example, see generally Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99
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apply it to Congress, focusing in particular on congressional
resolutions.98 They define “soft law” as “a rule issued by a lawmaking
authority that does not comply with constitutional and other
formalities or understandings that are necessary for the rule to be
legally binding.”99 Simple resolutions (passed by one house of
Congress) and concurrent resolutions (passed by both houses of
Congress, but not presented to the president) meet this definition,100
and Gersen and Posner push back on what they label “[t]he
conventional wisdom . . . that such measures lack importance because
they do not create binding legal obligations.”101 Instead, they
“advocate[] greater use of soft statutes by Congress and greater
reliance on soft statu[t]es by courts” in both statutory interpretation
and constitutional cases.102
Although Gersen and Posner do not discuss vetoed bills,103 such
bills or joint resolutions meet their definition of soft law: they are
issued by Congress, but the lack of presidential signature renders them
not legally binding.104 In fact, vetoed bills present a stronger case for
interpretive consideration than the simple and concurrent resolutions
on which they focus. Vetoed bills are proto-laws. The legislators who

CORNELL L. REV. 735 (2014); Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law,
2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171 (2010); and Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International
Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581 (2005).
98. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 577–78 (identifying congressional resolutions as a
type of soft law).
99. Id. at 579 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).
100. Id. at 580 (noting that they focus on “[t]wo prime examples of soft legislation”: simple
resolutions passed by one house of Congress and concurrent resolutions passed by both houses
of Congress (but not presented to the president)).
101. Id. at 578.
102. Id. at 617; see also id. at 607 (arguing that for statutory interpretation, a soft statute can
be “useful” if it “reveals the legislative intent” underlying a “hard statute” that is relevant to
interpretation of that hard statute or “if a later Congress’s policy views are relevant for
interpreting or construing the earlier statute”). But see Rankin M. Gibson, Congressional
Concurrent Resolutions: An Aid [to] Statutory Interpretation?, 37 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 421, 482–83
(1951) (arguing against the use of concurrent resolutions to interpret previously enacted statutes).
103. Greene similarly does not explicitly address the interpretive effect of vetoed bills, but he
seems implicitly to include vetoed bills through an unorthodox redefinition of concurrent
resolutions. See Greene, supra note 28, at 193–94 (arguing that “only concurrent resolutions
should suffice” as evidence of congressional intent, but noting that he “would count as a
concurrent resolution any bill that gains majority support in both Houses, whether the bill is styled
as a Concurrent Resolution and not submitted to the President, or styled as an Act or Joint
Resolution and is submitted to the President”).
104. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 579.
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voted for them intended them to be legally binding, but were thwarted
by a presidential veto. The choice of a form of congressional action that
can lead to enacted law sends a stronger signal of commitment on the
part of Congress than even a concurrent resolution passed with the
same majorities of both houses of Congress. The concurrent resolution,
unlike the vetoed bill or joint resolution, was not designed to be,
intended to become, or indeed capable of becoming legally binding.
The choice to use a bill or joint resolution instead of a concurrent
resolution is not pure or costless signaling. In many cases, there may be
uncertainty about a president’s reaction to a bill that passes both
houses of Congress.105 There is at least some probability that the
president will sign the bill into law (perhaps with a signing statement),
such that legislators would have to live with the legally binding
enactment. The choice of a potentially legally binding form of
congressional action raises the stakes for Congress and makes it less
likely that the legislature is engaged in cheap talk.106 As Gersen and
Posner explain, simple and concurrent resolutions are not costless for
Congress to adopt.107 Bills and joint resolutions are even more costly.
C. Justifying the Youngstown Canon
A variety of normative justifications support application of the
Youngstown canon. The justifications range from the theoretical to the
pragmatic, and the persuasiveness of each will depend to some extent
on one’s methodological priors. One’s approach to interpretation may
suggest a narrower or broader scope for application of the canon, but
the reasons for applying the Youngstown canon are strongest in
circumstances involving areas of shared constitutional power where the

105. In recent decades, the executive branch has typically conveyed its views on significant
bills via the issuance of a Statement of Administration Policy (“SAP”) prepared by the Office of
Management and Budget. See generally MEGHAN M. STUESSY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44539,
STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44539.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5LP5-QPW6] (describing when and the process by which SAPs are produced).
SAPs include the extent to which the president supports or opposes particular provisions or entire
bills and may include veto threats. Id. at 1–3. Even when a SAP is issued for a particular bill,
however, uncertainty may remain about whether the president will ultimately veto the bill if
passed by Congress. Id. at Summary (explaining that when a SAP includes a veto threat “it
appears in one of two ways: (1) a statement indicating that the President intends to veto the bill,
or (2) a statement that agencies or senior advisors would recommend that the President veto the
bill” and that “[t]hese two types indicate degrees of veto threat certainty”).
106. See infra notes 330–36 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 330–31 and accompanying text.
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allocation of authority between the legislature and the executive is
unsettled. Such cases may involve direct constitutional disputes or
statutory questions that nonetheless implicate such constitutional
questions.
1. Preserving the Separation of Powers and Constitutional Design.
One argument in favor of the Youngstown canon stems from the need
to preserve checks and balances within the federal constitutional
design. The Framers designed the Constitution with the aim of
ensuring that the branches would check each other and so guard the
liberty of the people.108 This design is particularly salient where the
Constitution divides authority over particular domains between
multiple branches or gives competing powers to different branches,
leaving ultimate authority underspecified.109 The evident appeal of this
structure is that the branches can effectively fight out constitutional
disputes amongst themselves.
But the experience of U.S. government has come far from 1789.
As Jackson noted in Youngstown, there is a “gap . . . between the
President’s paper powers and his real powers,” and “[v]ast accretions
of federal power . . . have magnified the scope of presidential
activity.”110 That statement is even truer today. The executive has
structural advantages over Congress that enable it to act quickly,
definitively, and often independently of the legislature.111 As Professor
108. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320, 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(explaining that “maintaining . . . the necessary partition of power among the several
departments, as laid down in the Constitution” requires “contriving the interior structure of the
government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of
keeping each other in their proper places” and that “[a]mbition must be made to counteract
ambition”); see also Greene, supra note 28, at 125 (“To the extent that there is any ‘original
understanding’ of the division of power between the President and Congress, it is that both are to
be feared, neither is to be trusted, and if either one grows too strong we might be in trouble.”).
109. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704–05 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
when an individual challenges governmental action “on grounds unrelated to separation of
powers, harmonious functioning of the system demands that we ordinarily give some deference,
or a presumption of validity, to the actions of the political branches in what is agreed, between
themselves at least, to be within their respective spheres,” but when a challenge “pertains to
separation of powers, and the political branches are . . . in disagreement, neither can be presumed
correct”).
110. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 653
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
111. See, e.g., EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT OFFICE AND POWERS: HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS OF PRACTICE AND OPINION 200 (2d ed. 1941) (noting with respect to foreign policy
that “the President has . . . certain great advantages” including “the unity of office, its capacity for
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Louis Henkin explained, “[c]oncurrent power often begets a race for
initiative and the President will usually ‘get there first.’”112
Perhaps the biggest change since the Framing period, however,
has been the rise of the party system.113 Party loyalties have ensured
that, contrary to the Framers’ vision of interbranch competition,
sometimes Congress helps the executive along in aggrandizing power
at the expense of the legislature.114 This is particularly likely when there
is unified government, where one party controls both Congress and the
presidency, making wins for one branch political wins for the other as
well.115
The long, slow drift of power toward the executive for reasons of
institutional design and party politics means that Congress faces an
uphill battle when it attempts to assert its institutional interests as
distinct from those of the president. The institutional interests of
Congress and the president are especially likely to be in opposition—
at least when there is divided government—on issues of concurrent
constitutional powers, when both branches have some claim to power
but its allocation between the two is unclear. In such cases, it becomes
particularly important to understand Congress’s institutional
perspective.
secrecy and despatch, and its superior sources of information; to which should be added the fact
that it is always on hand and ready for action, whereas the houses of Congress are in adjournment
much of the time”); Eichensehr, Conduct of Foreign Relations, supra note 15, at 653–54
(discussing the executive’s structural advantages over Congress); Terry M. Moe & William G.
Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 133 (1999)
(arguing that “the president’s formal capacity for taking unilateral action, and thus for making
law on his own” is “so central to an understanding of presidential power, that it virtually defines
what is distinctively modern about the modern American presidency”); cf. NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 532 (2014) (“[T]he Senate cannot easily register opposition as a body to
every governmental action that many, perhaps most, Senators oppose.”).
112. HENKIN, supra note 15, at 93.
113. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 15, at 2313 (“Political competition and cooperation
along relatively stable lines of policy and ideological disagreement quickly came to be channeled
not through the branches of government, but rather through an institution the Framers could
imagine only dimly but nevertheless despised: political parties.”).
114. Cf. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that the “rise of
the party system has made a significant extraconstitutional supplement to real executive power”
and that with “[p]arty loyalties and interests, sometimes more binding than law,” the president
can “extend his effective control into branches of government other than his own and . . . often
may win, as a political leader, what he cannot command under the Constitution”).
115. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 15, at 2329 (arguing that “when government is
unified . . . , we should expect interbranch competition to dissipate,” and instead will see
“[i]ntraparty cooperation (as a strategy of interparty competition) smooth[] over branch
boundaries and suppress[] the central dynamic assumed in the Madisonian model”).
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A superficially attractive approach for discerning Congress’s
views would be to look to enacted laws. However, considering only
enacted laws is an insufficient and inaccurate method of determining
Congress’s perspective because—unless adopted over a presidential
veto—enacted laws necessarily take into account the views of the
president. The president is part of the legislative bargain needed to
enact law, and so statutes reflect a compromise position.116 Presidents
have many mechanisms, such as executive orders, signing statements,
and the like, through which to express their positions independent of
Congress. Considering executive views expressed through such
mechanisms plus enacted laws effectively double counts the position of
the executive. Focusing only on enacted laws as a proxy for
congressional views, therefore, risks systematically skewing the
balance of constitutional powers in favor of the executive.117
To capture the views of the legislature requires looking to other
congressional actions,118 and the Youngstown canon helps to explain
where one should look—namely, vetoed bills. Vetoed bills in areas of
constitutional controversy are likely to more accurately convey the
institutional views of Congress than enacted bills do, because vetoed
bills do not reflect compromise—or at least, not much compromise—
with the executive. It is possible that they include some attempt by
Congress to anticipate and account for executive views in the hope of
gaining presidential signature, but they are generally less influenced by
executive views than enacted statutes to which the president agreed.
For similar reasons, Gersen and Posner argue that congressional
resolutions “more accurately convey[] information about
congressional views than hard law does,” especially “in domains where
Congress acts without the President’s cooperation,” such as “when it
expresses its views about its constitutional role.”119 At least until the
116. See, e.g., McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 719 (1992) (“[I]n the U.S. federal system, the President exercises
considerable influence over legislation and is, therefore, a member of most enacting coalitions.”).
117. See, e.g., Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 614 (“Exclusive reliance on hard statutes
will produce a body of constitutional law that is biased and incomplete.”).
118. Professor Oona Hathaway has recently proposed other ways to empower Congress to
act as an institutional counterweight to the executive, including establishing a congressional OLC
that could issue authoritative opinions on legal questions and counter the pro-executive tilt of the
Department of Justice OLC. Oona A. Hathaway, National Security Lawyering in the Post-War
Era: Can Law Constrain Power?, 68 UCLA L. REV. 2, 83–88 (2021).
119. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 594; see also id. at 617 (“[S]oft statutes will generally
be a superior mechanism for expressing legislative interpretations of the Constitution than
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Youngstown canon is broadly adopted,120 congressional resolutions
may be an even purer indication of congressional views than vetoed
bills because they do not attempt to gain presidential assent. But
something is lost with nonbinding resolutions as well: because they
have no possibility of becoming binding law, Congress may not take
them as seriously or view them as an appropriate vehicle for expressing
serious constitutional claims. Nonetheless, both nonbinding
congressional resolutions and vetoed bills are better sources for
discerning the institutional views of Congress than enacted statutes,
which necessarily reflect an executive perspective as well.
The Youngstown canon’s instruction to consider Congress’s views
helps to ensure that, in areas of shared, divided, and contested power,
interpreters can take into account Congress’s perspective, thus
rebalancing the skew that comes from overreliance on enacted law.
Doing so helps to preserve the balance of powers set out in the
adversarial constitutional system.
2. Respecting the Democratic Pedigree of Vetoed Bills. The
democratic pedigree of vetoed bills provides an additional justification
for considering them in interpreting ambiguous provisions. Vetoed
bills are majoritarian and thus on more robust democratic footing than
other sources, like committee reports, floor statements, and
congressional inaction, that courts and other interpreters often
reference to understand Congress’s views.121 Considering
congressional views expressed by vetoed bills as a canon of
construction provides a way to give some meaning to congressional
actions that would have constitutional significance, but for a
presidential veto.122 Such actions, of course, are not sufficient to make
new law.123 But at the same time, the views of Congress on the
committee hearings, floor speeches, confirmation hearings, committee reports, hard statutes, or
the failure to enact hard statutes.”).
120. The canon’s adoption could decrease existing incentives for Congress to proceed via
concurrent resolutions and instead prompt more frequent pushes to pass bills, even if the
president ultimately vetoes them. See infra Part III.C.
121. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 612 (“Unlike other forms of legislative history—
commonly given weight by judges already—the soft statute is majoritarian and provides a better
indication of congressional intent than congressional silence or inaction.”); see also supra notes
87–90 and accompanying text (discussing congressional inaction and the rejected proposal rule).
122. For data on the frequency with which presidents veto legislation (and the frequency with
which Congress overrides such vetoes), see MEGHAN M. STUESSY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22188,
REGULAR VETOES AND POCKET VETOES: IN BRIEF 3–7 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RS22188.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD6B-624T].
123. See supra notes 34–52 (discussing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923 (1983)).
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constitutional allocation of powers between branches of the federal
government, expressed through a democratically legitimate vehicle,
can cast light on constitutional debates.
Imagine, for example, a case in which the president argues that
Congress has long acquiesced in unilateral executive action in a
particular area. Majoritarian objection by Congress in the form of a
bicamerally adopted bill—even if vetoed by the president—would
provide strong evidence of Congress’s nonacquiescence in the
president’s claim of authority. That nonacquiescence should be
relevant for a court or executive branch interpreter in assessing
historical gloss–related arguments about the validity of the president’s
claim. Or consider a case in which the president asserts that he is acting
pursuant to a statutory delegation of power, but is pushing or possibly
exceeding the delegation’s bounds. Here, Congress’s adoption of a bill
to refute the president’s reading of the scope of the delegation could
serve as some evidence that the executive’s reading is not the best or
even a permissible one.124 Assuming the president vetoes the bill, the
Youngstown canon could be one consideration tipping the interpretive
scales against the president by, for example, counteracting some of the
usual deference courts afford the executive in national security or
foreign relations cases.
The alternative of treating constitutional views expressed by a
majority of both houses of Congress as a legal nullity is deeply
unsatisfying. It seems especially odd to ignore congressional opposition
to presidential action when that opposition is equal or greater in
magnitude to the congressional action that the president claims puts
him in Youngstown Category One. This would occur in instances where
a president claims authority to act based on a statute, passed by a
majority of both houses of Congress and signed by the president, but a
subsequent Congress votes by an equal or greater majority to deny the
president’s authority to act. The only difference in the two situations is
the view of the president; the intensity of the congressional view is at
least equal across cases, if not greater in the subsequent attempt to
restrict the president. In such a case, Chadha instructs that the later
congressional opposition cannot be treated as binding law; it cannot
undo an earlier delegation, absent presidential signature or a veto
override. But the Youngstown canon charts a middle course. In such an
instance, if there is ambiguity in the president’s claim of authority—
124. See infra notes 208–14 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the 2002 Iraq
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) to justify hostilities against Iran).
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whether based in a statute or the Constitution—then Congress’s later
majoritarian opposition can shade the interpretation of the underlying
authority. In other words, the Youngstown canon suggests that the
president does not get the benefit of the interpretive doubt. Majority
action by Congress can inflect interpretation in these circumstances.
Using the expressed views of Congress—as reflected in majoritarian
congressional action—as an interpretive tool to construe the scope of
executive power bolsters the Constitution’s allocation of powers to
multiple branches of the federal government.125
The justification for valuing congressional views might be further
strengthened if the congressional opposition to the president is
bipartisan or otherwise crosses party lines, as in the case of
majoritarian congressional opposition in a time of unified government.
The existence of such opposition suggests both that the legislature’s
view results from something more than politics126 and that it may
represent a broad coalition, potentially enhancing its democratic
pedigree.127 At the same time, when government is divided—that is,
when one party controls Congress and the opposite party holds the
presidency—majoritarian action by Congress that falls purely along
party lines should not be dismissed out of hand as mere politics. The
congressional opposition may rest on strong constitutional objections,
but the pull of party discipline may be even stronger.128 In other words,
congressional opposition that is not just bicameral but also bipartisan
could act as a plus factor, strengthening the case for taking seriously
Congress’s views, but it is not a prerequisite.129

125. Cf. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959–60 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that
because “Congress has included the [legislative] veto in literally hundreds of statutes, dating back
to the 1930’s[,] Congress clearly views this procedure as essential to controlling the delegation of
power to administrative agencies” and that the Court should afford Congress the “respect due its
judgment as a coordinate branch of Government” by deciding the case narrowly).
126. See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text (distinguishing vetoes that are purely
policy based from those that involve separation-of-powers disputes).
127. Cf. Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53
UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1249 (2006) (“Given the diverse and eclectic makeup of Congress, any policy
approved by that body will likely include a greater range of voices and input than a unilateral
decision by the president.”).
128. Cf. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 15, at 2352 (explaining that “[i]f a partisan majority in
Congress generally shares the President’s ideological and policy goals, abdication [of
congressional prerogatives] might further the party’s interest in uniting behind the President”).
129. Notably, Professors Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes propose that courts should
consider whether government is unified or divided in construing statutes related to executive
authority. Id. at 2354. Specifically, drawing on Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence, they propose,
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One might reasonably wonder whether considering vetoed bills is
a species of subsequent legislative history. The Supreme Court has
“often observed . . . that ‘the views of a subsequent Congress form a
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.’”130 The
hazard is at least twofold. First, even among those whose interpretive
approaches allow resort to congressional intent, “the legislative ‘intent’
relevant to statutory interpretation is the intent of the enacting
Congress, not the continuing intent of subsequent Congresses.”131 And
second, as a practical matter, subsequent legislative history “is highly
unreliable and subject to strategic manipulation.”132
As explained above, however, the views of Congress as expressed
in vetoed bills need not fall prey to these criticisms of subsequent
legislative history. The purpose of looking to vetoed bills is not to
discern the intent of the enacting Congress. Courts and executive
“When it is not clear whether congressional statutes prohibit the executive action at issue or
simply do not address it, and Congress is controlled by the President’s political party, perhaps
courts should . . . tilt[] toward prohibiting presidential action (particularly when that action
amounts to a novel expansion of executive power).” Id. They also recognize “the flipside” of this
rule, namely “that courts should more generously construe statutes as supporting executive
authority when government is divided.” Id. Although this proposal could encourage presidents to
obtain congressional authorization during times of unified government, id. at 2354, 2356, it raises
a number of difficulties. It could exacerbate the drift in power to the executive by incentivizing
the president to seek broad statutory authorizations during unified government that will be
difficult to pull back later and encouraging the president to push legal boundaries during times of
divided government with the knowledge that he can veto any restrictions Congress attempts to
adopt. Another challenge may come from courts’ likely reaction to the proposal. As Levinson
and Pildes themselves recognize, “it is hard to imagine courts expressly making legal doctrine turn
on the partisan configuration of government (though it is easier to imagine them doing so sub
rosa).” Id. at 2355. More fundamentally though, allowing the content of law to vary based solely
on the political characteristics of the branches of the government, not any change to the law itself,
creates due process-related challenges about notice and predictability. By contrast, the
Youngstown canon asks courts and other interpreters to consider formal action by Congress—the
passage of bills or joint resolutions. Although bipartisanship may provide evidence of the legal
nature of congressional opposition and the breadth of the coalition supporting it, the proposed
canon does not require courts to take politics or the existence of unified versus divided
government into account.
130. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 355 (1998) (quoting United States
v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348–49 (1963)); see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct.
1731, 1747 (2020) (“[S]peculation about why a later Congress declined to adopt new legislation
offers a ‘particularly dangerous’ basis on which to rest an interpretation of an existing law a
different and earlier Congress did adopt.” (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990))).
131. Eskridge, supra note 89, at 95; see also Gibson, supra note 102, at 483 (“A subsequently
passed concurrent resolution should not be accepted as persuasive evidence of the legislative
intent in fact existing at the time of the enactment of a public law.”).
132. Eskridge, supra note 89, at 95.
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interpreters can and should look to Congress’s views for reasons other
than discerning the intent of the Congress that initially enacted a
statute. For many of the cases in which vetoed bills are at issue, the
relevant text is the Constitution, not (or not exclusively) a statute.133 In
such cases, dismissing the views of the current Congress as mere
subsequent legislative history would miss the point. Congress’s action
can be treated not as subsequent legislative history, but as current
constitutional prerogative—as nonacquiescence to executive power
grabs and legislative explication of the separation of powers. To be
sure, Congress’s views need not be determinative of the interpretive
question at issue. Clear text—whether statutory or constitutional—will
control. But where the relevant authority is unclear, there is no reason
to exclude from consideration the views of Congress on a separation of
powers question.
Moreover, for all its frequent statements about the hazards
attending subsequent legislative history, the Court does rely on at least
certain kinds of such history with some frequency. This is particularly
true with respect to interpretive inferences from legislative inaction,
where courts interpret a statute passed at Time One in light of
subsequent Congresses’ failures to act at Times Two, Three, etc.134
Professor William Eskridge argues that “most of the legislative
inaction cases . . . are inconsistent with the traditional proposition that
the legislative ‘intent’ relevant to statutory interpretation is the intent
of the enacting Congress, not the continuing intent of subsequent
Congresses.”135 True, but such cases often cite congressional inaction
not really for the purpose of determining congressional intent in the
traditional sense—that is, the intent of the enacting Congress about a
statute’s meaning at the time of passage. Rather, they look to
Congress’s later inaction as evidence of congressional acquiescence in
or approval of the actions of another branch, be it the judiciary or the

133. See infra Part II.B.
134. See Eskridge, supra note 89, at 84–85 (“In many of its acquiescence and reenactment
cases, the Court fortifies its argument that legislative inaction has ratified the existing
interpretation by pointing to the rejection of the opposite interpretation by either the enacting
Congress or a subsequent one.”); see, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 143–44 (2000) (citing Congress’s failure to adopt bills granting the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) authority to regulate tobacco to support the holding that FDA lacked
such authority); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972) (discussing legislation that failed to pass
in Congress over a period of fifty years).
135. Eskridge, supra note 89, at 95.
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executive.136 By a similar token, one could consider the subsequent
views of Congress, as expressed in vetoed bills, when they show
congressional nonacquiescence or disapproval of another branch’s
action.137 Looking to such congressional action also mitigates a
pragmatic concern with drawing meaning from congressional
inaction—namely, that it can be difficult to discern why Congress chose
not to act.138 With vetoed bills, such an assessment is unnecessary:
Congress has acted.
3. Redressing Bargains Disrupted by Chadha. To push the
argument further, another justification for applying the Youngstown
canon even in certain cases involving purely statutory delegations of
power rests on the idea of partially redressing the tremendous
disruption to interbranch bargains that the Supreme Court caused in
Chadha. The Court’s decision to invalidate legislative vetoes severely
disrupted the allocation of power that Congress had intended in
numerous statutory schemes.139 In hundreds of statutes, Congress
delegated authority to the executive with the understanding that it
could pull back that authority via mechanisms, like concurrent
resolutions, that are not subject to presidential veto. Chadha rendered
unconstitutional the legislative vetoes through which Congress had
intended to police executive power; and in a later case, Alaska Airlines

136. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 144 (explaining that Congress’s later passage
of specific statutes relating to tobacco regulation (and failure to pass statutes giving the FDA
broad authority to regulate tobacco) “have effectively ratified the FDA’s long-held position that
it lacks jurisdiction under the . . . [original statute] to regulate tobacco products”); Flood, 407 U.S.
at 283–84 (deeming Congress’s failure over decades to overturn prior statutory interpretation
decisions “positive inaction” and arguing that Congress “has clearly evinced a desire not to
disapprove them legislatively”).
137. See supra notes 87–90 (discussing the rejected proposal rule as an example of an existing
interpretive principle relying on congressional inaction and the Youngstown canon’s reliance on
affirmative congressional action).
138. Eskridge, supra note 89, at 98 (identifying realist problems with inferring legislative
intent from legislative inaction, in particular “problems of inference” in determining “[w]hat, in
fact, does the inaction mean?”).
139. For a compilation of statutory provisions impacted by Chadha, see THOMAS J.
WICKHAM, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS, H.R. DOC.
NO. 115-177, at 1147–1338 (2019). Searching for “Chadha” highlights numerous statutory
provisions affected by the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the legislative veto. For an explanation
of the congressional practice of legislative vetoes post-Chadha, see generally LOUIS FISHER,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22132, LEGISLATIVE VETOES AFTER CHADHA (2005), http://
www.loufisher.org/docs/lv/4116.pdf [https://perma.cc/QM4Q-RARE].
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v. Brock,140 the Court then “applied the standard severability test in a
way that rendered all or virtually all legislative vetoes severable from
their statutes.”141 The two decisions taken together have locked in
delegations to the executive that Congress had intended to subject to
ongoing congressional monitoring and clawback. Now, Congress can
only readjust these delegations if the president agrees or if it can secure
a supermajority to overcome a presidential veto.
Although this category of cases involves statutory delegations of
power to the executive, there is a strong argument that even if later
vetoed bills attempting to pull back on the delegations are technically
subsequent legislative history, considering Congress’s later expressed
views is the least courts can do given that Chadha fundamentally
disrupted the balance of power Congress intended to maintain. The
operative text being interpreted in these cases is statutory—the scope
of the statutory delegation—but the fundamental principles at issue are
constitutional. The constitutional significance becomes apparent when
looking at particular statutes that fall in this category, including the
NEA and the War Powers Resolution (“WPR”), which are discussed
in detail below.142
In practice, applying the Youngstown canon in this set of cases will
interact with a severability analysis. Courts apply a presumption in
favor of severability and follow a set of “fairly well established” rules,
even if judges do not always apply them consistently.143 In Alaska
Airlines, the Court explained that the severability analysis turns on
congressional intent.144 The Court will decline to sever an
unconstitutional provision “if the balance of the legislation is incapable
of functioning independently” or if the remaining statute “is legislation

140. Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 697 (1987) (severing a legislative veto provision
because the Court “cannot conclude that Congress would have failed to enact the Airline
Deregulation Act . . . if the legislative veto had not been included”).
141. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 52, at 524.
142. See infra Parts II.A–B.
143. Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 884
(2005); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 54, at 529–30 (2014) (noting that the Supreme Court
“has not always applied consistent criteria to decide” severability questions and instead “applies
what have been identified as multiple tests,” including (1) “whether the statute works without the
severed portion in the way that Congress intended”; (2) “whether Congress would have enacted
the law absent the severed provisions”; (3) “whether the remaining provisions are capable of
functioning independently”; and (4) whether Congress included “a severability clause in the statute
itself declaring Congress’s intentions”).
144. See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684.
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that Congress would not have enacted.”145 The Court explained that
“[t]he more relevant inquiry in evaluating severability is whether the
statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent of
Congress.”146 With respect to severing unconstitutional legislative veto
provisions, the Court was not blind to the separation of powers
consequences of its Chadha decision, instead noting that “the absence
of the veto necessarily alters the balance of powers between the
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Federal Government.”147
The Court explained that with respect to legislative vetoes, courts
should “consider the nature of the delegated authority that Congress
made subject to a veto” because “[s]ome delegations of power to the
Executive . . . may have been so controversial or so broad that Congress
would have been unwilling to make the delegation without a strong
oversight mechanism.”148
The Youngstown canon could interact with severability analysis in
two ways. First, and most straightforwardly, the views of the current
Congress on a prior delegation of authority—when that authority was
made subject to a legislative veto later rendered unconstitutional—
could be considered as part of the analysis of the “nature of the
delegated authority” per Alaska Airlines.149 Congressional attempts to
push back on continued executive exercise of previously delegated
authority in these circumstances may be taken as evidence that
Congress would not have delegated in the first instance, and, therefore,
that the presumption in favor of severability should be overcome.
Here, the Youngstown canon’s instruction to consider Congress’s
vetoed views functions as a counter-canon to the presumption in favor
145. Id. at 684–85; see also Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46
STAN. L. REV. 235, 291 (1994) (“A court can hold an invalid provision of a statute severable if:
(1) the remaining statute functions as a coherent whole; and (2) the evidence does not show that
Congress would not have enacted the statute absent the invalid provision.”); Metzger, supra note
143, at 884 (“Severability in regard to federal statutes is ostensibly a question of congressional
intent and functionality: Would Congress have enacted the remaining provisions without the
severed portions, and can the remaining portions function independently?”); Vermeule, supra
note 75, at 1950 (“[C]ourts presume that the constitutionally valid applications of statutes should
be severed from any constitutionally invalid applications, leaving the valid applications in force,
unless Congress would not have intended the valid applications to stand alone.”).
146. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685; see also Gluck, supra note 88, at 92 (explaining that “the
presumption in favor of severability . . . centers almost entirely on the question of whether
excising only the objectionable part of a statute will allow it to ‘function’ as ‘Congress intended’”).
147. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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of severability. Alternatively, even if the Youngstown canon’s focus on
the current views of Congress is regarded as insufficient to rebut the
presumption in favor of severing the unconstitutional legislative veto,
the canon could nonetheless be deployed to narrowly construe the
delegated authority in the remaining part of the statute, to the extent
that such authority is ambiguous.
Used in either fashion, the majority votes of both houses of
Congress that form the basis for the relevant action for the Youngstown
canon are clearer expressions of Congress’s views than the imaginative
speculation that severability doctrine currently directs judges to
undertake. Severability doctrine asks courts to engage in a hypothetical
and counterfactual inquiry about “what the legislature would have
done” if it had known that courts would hold a provision
unconstitutional, “not what the legislature actually did.”150 This inquiry
“often calls for rank speculation.”151 Better than such speculation is the
Youngstown canon’s ability to account for Congress’s perspective,
expressed in a majoritarian process and subsequent to understanding
the invalidity of the legislative veto provision that the enacting
Congress intended to ensure an ongoing check on the executive.152

150. Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 744 (2010); see also
Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2350 (2020) (plurality opinion)
(explaining that “absent a severability or nonseverability clause, a court often cannot really know
what the two Houses of Congress and the President from the time of original enactment of a law
would have wanted if one provision of a law were later declared unconstitutional” and noting that
“this formulation often leads to an analytical dead end”).
151. Walsh, supra note 150, at 753; see also John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 203, 211 (1993) (criticizing the “present test for severability” on the ground that “in asking
what the legislature would have done if it had known that part of a law would be invalidated, the
test calls for an ‘answer’ that is often little more than speculation”); Caleb Nelson, What Is
Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 405 (2005) (“[C]ourts conducting severability analysis routinely
have to speculate about how the enacting Congress would have answered a question that it did
not actually face.”).
152. Scholars have noted severability doctrine’s risk to the balance of powers between the
legislature and judiciary. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 145, at 292–93 (noting that severability
doctrine’s “heavy bias towards finding statutes severable threatens the separation of powers
between Congress and the judiciary” because in severing unconstitutional provisions, the court
“substitutes a judicially rewritten law”). This risk is further heightened where the statute the
judiciary is rewriting implicates the balance of powers between the political branches. Although
use of the Youngstown canon in these circumstances may be subject to the subsequent legislative
history critique discussed above, see supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text, an exception to
this critique may be warranted given the Court’s creation of and reliance on an amorphous test
of imaginative construction of supposed congressional views. The question becomes whose views
should be substituted for those of the enacting Congress: The judiciary’s or a later Congress’s?
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4. Clarifying Application of the Youngstown Framework. A final
justification for and benefit of the Youngstown canon stems from its
interaction with Jackson’s Youngstown framework. Despite its
frequent invocation and canonical status,153 Jackson’s tripartite scheme
is rather underspecified and, as Jackson himself called it, “oversimplified.”154 The framework is underspecified especially with respect
to Category Two cases, where it provides little guidance on case
outcomes and even on the nature of the category itself.155 Professor
Laurence Tribe has criticized “the nearly sacrosanct triptych” as
“deeply ambiguous on the key question of what to make of
congressional silence.”156 The framework is oversimplified in
suggesting that the three categories are clearly divisible. Rather, as the
Supreme Court itself later explained, “executive action in any
particular instance falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but
rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit
congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition.”157
The Youngstown canon can help clarify application of Jackson’s
Youngstown framework in at least two ways.
First, the Youngstown canon suggests a way—consistent with
Chadha—to address congressional opposition in cases where the
president claims implied authorization from Congress. Jackson
included within Category One instances where “the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.”158 The
most significant case in which the Supreme Court has found implied
authorization is Dames & Moore v. Regan.159 There, the Court assessed
the lawfulness of executive actions related to the Iran hostage crisis,
Especially in separation of powers disputes between the executive and the legislature, considering
the view of Congress—any Congress—may be preferable.
153. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
154. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
155. See Eichensehr, Conduct of Foreign Relations, supra note 15, at 652–55 (discussing
indeterminacy with respect to Youngstown Category Two). For an illuminating study of the
diverse ways that lower federal courts approach and attempt to avoid Youngstown Category Two,
see Michael Coenen & Scott M. Sullivan, The Elusive Zone of Twilight, 62 B.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3583471 [https://
perma.cc/89PL-GUZD].
156. Laurence H. Tribe, Transcending the Youngstown Triptych: A Multidimensional
Reappraisal of Separation of Powers Doctrine, 126 YALE L.J. F. 86, 91 (2016).
157. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981).
158. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
159. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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including whether the president could suspend claims against Iran that
remained pending in U.S. courts. The Court considered several statutes
and determined that none “constitute[d] specific authorization of the
President’s action suspending claims.”160 Nonetheless, the Court
considered them “highly relevant in the looser sense of indicating
congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in
circumstances such as those presented in this case.”161 The Court also
noted a lack of congressional opposition and a “history of
congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the
President.”162 In tension with Youngstown itself, where close-but-notquite statutes were cited as evidence that Congress had rejected the
president’s claimed authority, the Court in Dames & Moore concluded
that “the President was authorized to suspend pending claims” and that
“Congress may be considered to have consented to the President’s
action.”163
The idea of implied authorizations being sufficient for Category
One may be troubling in and of itself.164 Category One, after all, comes
with “the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial
interpretation.”165 Presidents have an incentive to attempt to claim that
Congress has impliedly authorized their actions, putting them in
Category One. And courts may have an incentive to accept such claims
because it simplifies their ultimate task of resolving the
constitutionality of executive action, rather than admitting that

160. Id. at 677.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 678–79.
163. Id. at 686.
164. Cf. Tribe, supra note 156, at 92–93 (arguing that the bicameralism and presentment
requirements “exist both to prevent the gradual deformation of our governmental structure and
to protect individual liberty,” and that “[b]y ignoring these obstacles, Jackson’s celebrated
Youngstown concurrence invites courts to give the force of law to extra-constitutional
congressional action by directing judicial attention to the ineffable, and judicially constructed,
‘implied will of Congress’ rather than to the actual terms of duly enacted laws” (footnote
omitted)). Tribe’s main concern seems to be that considering the implied will of Congress
empowers Congress to avoid bicameralism and presentment. I see a comparatively greater risk in
the executive over-claiming authorization from Congress and convincing courts that executive
action falls in Category One, with its thumb on the scale in the president’s favor, rather than
Category Two.
165. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Congress is silent and grappling with the indeterminacy of Youngstown
Category Two.166
But for congressional prerogatives, implied authorizations are
especially problematic. By definition, such cases rely on actions by
Congress that do not authorize presidential action, perhaps combined
with congressional inaction, which may be constitutionally meaningful
or may simply result from institutional challenges and political
gridlock. Here, the Youngstown canon can help. The canon ensures
that explicit congressional action, even when vetoed by the president,
counts in the Youngstown calculus.
Imagine a case in which the president appears poised to claim
implied congressional authorization for a particular action that he
could not take acting alone or that at least would be on shaky
constitutional ground if done based solely on executive power.
Congress then reacts by passing a bill explicitly denying the president
the authority, but the president vetoes the bill. If there is ambiguity
about the scope of the president’s constitutional authority, as there
often would be in this situation, the Youngstown canon instructs courts
to construe the president’s claimed authority narrowly. The canon
therefore ensures that congressional opposition—expressed in a
majoritarian fashion—is weighed against executive claims of implied
authorization. The canon does not give the vetoed bill binding legal
effect, which would run afoul of Chadha, but it ensures that the most
explicit and on-point expression of Congress’s views on a particular
executive action can influence assessments of implied authorization
and congressional acquiescence.
In some ways, Dames & Moore was an easy case for implied
authorization because Congress had not objected in any way to the
president’s settlement of the hostage crisis or earlier claims settlements
by the executive. The Court noted that “Congress has not enacted
legislation, or even passed a resolution, indicating its displeasure with
the Agreement,” and “[w]e are thus clearly not confronted with a
situation in which Congress has in some way resisted the exercise of
Presidential authority.”167 The Court’s suggestion that even a
nonbinding resolution might have been sufficient to alter its analysis

166. Cf. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 15, at 2353–54 (arguing that to avoid “Justice Jackson’s
purgatorial ‘zone of twilight,’ . . . judges frequently attribute to vague legislation a ‘clear’
congressional endorsement (or sometimes, a ‘clear’ congressional prohibition) of the executive
action at issue”).
167. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 687–88 (emphasis added).
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lends credence to the Youngstown canon’s approach. Neither
congressional action—a resolution or a vetoed bill—would necessarily
be determinative of the outcome of the ultimate constitutional
question, but both could be relevant.
Second, the Youngstown canon can help to clarify the application
of the Youngstown framework through its interaction with historical
gloss. The idea of historical gloss is often traced to Justice Felix
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Youngstown. Frankfurter
explained, “Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting
government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they
give meaning to the words of a text or supply them.”168 He counseled
that
a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in
by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution . . . may
be treated as a gloss on “executive Power” vested in the President by
§ 1 of Art. II.169

Historical gloss can be relevant to any of Jackson’s three Youngstown
categories. Longstanding practice can demonstrate congressional
approval or disapproval of executive action as required for Categories
One and Three, or a longstanding practice of congressional silence may
be evidence of the distribution of constitutional authority in the
Category Two “zone of twilight.”170 The “most common reason” for
invocation of historical practice in separation of powers disputes is “the
idea that the cited practice involves the ‘acquiescence’ of one branch
in the actions of the other”—typically, congressional acquiescence in
the executive’s actions.171
Invocations of historical gloss raise the issue of what it means for
Congress to “question” executive practice. The clearest mechanism for
Congress to question or register objections to executive action is, of
course, enactment of a law, either with the president’s concurrence or
over the president’s veto. As explained above, however, in
constitutional clashes where Congress and the president have
conflicting institutional interests, it is unrealistic to expect much
168. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 610–11.
170. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 419 (2012); Eichensehr, Conduct of Foreign Relations, supra note
15, at 621–22.
171. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 170, at 414.

EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1282

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/23/2021 9:06 PM

[Vol. 70:1245

evidence of this sort. The president is unlikely to agree with laws
cabining executive power, and expecting Congress to act with a
supermajority of both houses is asking too much. Looking only to
enacted law to discern the views of Congress then risks skewing
constitutional analysis sharply in favor of the executive. For these
reasons, as well as more general concerns about institutional structures
that make it difficult for Congress to enact even routine legislation,172
scholars argue for looking beyond enacted law to congressional “soft
law” to discern whether Congress has questioned executive practice.173
As Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison explain, “[t]he
greatest risk” with respect to Youngstown Category Two cases “is in
too readily concluding that Congress has remained silent . . . , and
consequently inferring acquiescence from such purported silence.”174
Considering the views of Congress expressed in vetoed bills
alongside other soft law mechanisms helps to remedy the tendency to
equate a lack of enacted bills with a lack of congressional objection.
The views of Congress expressed in a vetoed bill may not be enough to
put a president into Category Three on their own (depending on one’s
constitutional interpretation methodology), but at the very least, they
can weaken a president’s claim to be in Category Two. Majority action
by both houses of Congress is hard to characterize as congressional
silence, as required for Category Two. Other types of soft law, such as
committee reports or one-house resolutions, are subject to the critique
that they do not represent Congress’s institutional views, and thus that
even in the face of such action, Congress as a whole has perhaps been
silent. But even if one disregards such actions in considering historical
gloss or assessing congressional silence or acquiescence, vetoed bills,
like concurrent resolutions, surmount that critique. Majority action by
both houses is the antithesis of silence.
To return to the critiques of Youngstown noted above, the effect
of the Youngstown canon on traditional Youngstown analysis is easier
to grasp by moving beyond the “over-simplified” idea that the three
Youngstown categories represent rigid differentiations. The canon
works best if the framework is understood to represent a spectrum.
Application of the canon moves the president down the spectrum and
172. See id. at 440–47 (discussing impediments to congressional actions, such as vetogates and
collective action problems).
173. See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 95, at 66 (“[E]vidence of congressional nonacquiescence
should extend beyond the enactment of opposing statutes and should include various forms of
congressional ‘soft law,’ such as committee reports and nonbinding resolutions.”).
174. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 170, at 450.
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further away from congressional authorization, in the case of the
implied Category One cases, or further away from congressional
silence and toward congressional prohibition in the case of the
Category Two cases where historical gloss is most prevalent. One could
argue, in line with the simplified three-category approach, that the
canon knocks the president from Category One into Category Two, or
from Category Two into Category Three. Depending on one’s
preferred method, that approach may be attractive. But it is also
subject to the possible formalist objection that it gives too much legal
effect to congressional action short of law. Understanding the
Youngstown framework as a spectrum on which there are many shades
of gray largely moots this objection.
An important caveat is in order. The Youngstown canon’s focus
on vetoed bills is likely to favor Congress in most cases, but that may
not be uniformly true. Having interpreters look to vetoed bills may
simultaneously encourage them to look at presidential veto messages
or other executive expressions of constitutional objections to vetoed
bills.175 For example, Chief Justice John Roberts’s recent majority
opinion in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau176
cited constitutional objections in an Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”)
opinion and a veto message from President Ronald Reagan to an
earlier bill about a different federal agency as support for holding
unconstitutional the for-cause removal protection afforded to the
director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.177 One could
imagine constitutional battle waged between the branches where on a
particular issue Congress repeatedly passes bills that presidents of both
parties consistently veto, along with veto messages explaining the
executive’s constitutional objections. A long-standing practice of
executive vetoes of a particular congressional initiative on
constitutional grounds could influence a historical gloss analysis by
showing a consistent executive view of the issue over time, agreement
among presidents of different parties, or a lack of acquiescence by the

175. For examples of veto messages, see U.S. Senate, Vetoes, 1789 to Present, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/vetoes/vetoCounts.htm [https://perma.cc/STY3-62WA].
176. Seila L. LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
177. Id. at 2201 (discussing constitutional objections to the structure of the Office of the
Special Counsel (citing Memorandum Op. from the Gen. Couns., Civil Serv. Comm’n, 2 Op.
O.L.C. 120, 122 (1978); Memorandum of Disapproval on a Bill Concerning Whistleblower
Protection, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1391–92 (Oct. 26, 1988))); see also id. at 2192 (holding that the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau director “must be removable by the President at will”).
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executive in Congress’s constitutional views.178 Looking to vetoed bills
as interpretive aids may therefore not be an unalloyed good for
Congress to the extent that it also prompts courts and other
interpreters to consider countervailing and unilateral executive
views.179 For courts and for the rule of law, however, greater clarity
about the branches’ views is a net benefit, regardless of the precise
outcome of the congressional–presidential power struggle.
*

*

*

The proposed Youngstown canon is just that—a canon of
construction. For that reason, some may regard it as a weak bulwark
against executive aggrandizement. Canons sometimes fall to
countercanons180 or suffer inconsistent application by courts.181 But
using attempted congressional opposition as an interpretive aid, rather
than a legally binding rule, is precisely the feature of this Article’s
proposal that allows it to comply with Chadha. Considering
congressional opposition as one among a number of factors or
interpretive principles that courts and other interpreters should take
into account is an improvement over disregarding such opposition as
an irrelevant nullity.
178. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s
Youngstown opinion and historical gloss); see also infra note 333 (discussing OLC’s reliance on
consistent practice of presidents of different parties in historical gloss analysis).
179. Courts already occasionally rely on unilateral executive expressions of constitutional
views on statutes. See, e.g., Seila, 140 S. Ct at 2202 (citing signing statement by President Bill
Clinton that “questioned the constitutionality” of the single-director structure of a federal
agency); cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 523 (2010) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (citing the absence of a constitutional objection in a signing statement by President
George W. Bush as support for the lack of constitutional problem with a two-level for-cause
removal protection).
180. For the canonical discussion of canons and countercanons, see Karl N. Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are
To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950), setting out a number of canons in “thrust
but parry” format. But see, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1191 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (arguing that “[o]f course there are pairs of maxims
susceptible of being invoked for opposing conclusions,” but “[o]nce it is understood that meaning
depends upon context, and that contexts vary, how could it be otherwise?”).
181. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 89, at 91 (“For every case where the Court rhapsodizes
about deliberative inaction, there is a counter-case subjecting such inferences to scathing
critique.”); id. app. at 1–3 (showing the Supreme Court applying and failing to apply canons based
on legislative inaction); Gluck & Bressman, supra note 53, at 951 (“[F]ederal courts are
notoriously inconsistent in their application of the canons . . . .”).
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The Youngstown canon is also insulated from some critiques
lodged against other canons. It is based, by definition, on congressional
action, not congressional silence.182 And it’s the kind of canon that may
become known to and internalized by Congress.183 Professors Abbe
Gluck and Lisa Bressman have shown that congressional drafters are
aware of and draft legislation with a view toward some substantive
canons, including federalism presumptions, which are similar to the
Youngstown canon in seeking to preserve structural constitutional
values.184 In fact, Congress may already anticipate some form of a
Youngstown canon. Some proposed bills that seek to push back on
executive action—and that may be in the category of future vetoed
bills—would authorize litigation on the part of Congress, during which
counsel for Congress would likely argue to courts about congressional
opposition.185
II. APPLICATIONS
Building on the definition of the Youngstown canon in Part I, this
Part explores how the canon could apply in practice. It provides four
illustrative examples of ways the canon might apply in areas of shared
constitutional power where the allocation of authority between
Congress and the president is unsettled.

182. Cf. Eskridge, supra note 89, at 90–108 (discussing a variety of problems with inferring
legislative intent from congressional inaction).
183. For a seminal study on congressional awareness of canons and other interpretive rules,
see generally Gluck & Bressman, supra note 53. For a discussion of how adopting the Youngstown
canon might influence congressional behavior, see infra Part III.C.
184. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 53, at 942 (explaining that “some kind of courts-Congress
interpretive feedback loop does exist, at least with respect to certain interpretive rules,” including
“federalism presumptions”).
185. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 4, 116th Cong. § 4 (Jan. 17, 2019) (authorizing the Senate Legal Counsel
and General Counsel to the House of Representatives to “represent Congress in initiating or
intervening in any judicial proceedings in any Federal court of competent jurisdiction on behalf
of Congress in order to oppose any effort to suspend, terminate, or withdraw the United States
from the North Atlantic Treaty in a manner inconsistent with this joint resolution”); see also
Hathaway, supra note 118, at 87 (discussing the litigating authority of the House and Senate
Offices of General Counsel). Litigation by one or both houses of Congress that brings to courts’
attention prior opposition—especially majoritarian opposition—to presidential action may be
more persuasive than congressional opposition that is voiced for the first time in a litigation brief.
Cf. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (explaining that the Court will
not afford deference to agency views expressed for the first time in litigation).
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A. War Powers
The allocation of war powers between the president and Congress
is one of the most hotly contested areas of constitutional law,186 and it
is one where the Youngstown canon can add value. The Constitution
confers war-related authorities on both Congress and the president.
Article I grants Congress the powers, among other things, “[t]o declare
War,” “[t]o raise and support Armies,” “[t]o provide and maintain a
Navy,” and “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces.”187 Article II, on the other hand, makes the
president the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States.”188 As Jackson noted, “[t]hese cryptic words have given
rise to some of the most persistent controversies in our constitutional
history.”189 Indeed, “just what authority goes with the name
[Commander-in-Chief] has plagued presidential advisers who would
not waive or narrow it by nonassertion yet cannot say where it begins
or ends.”190 Presidents have long claimed a core—often a large one—
of exclusive executive authority over war powers that is not subject to
congressional regulation.
Congress has only rarely attempted to rein in executive war
powers. Its “boldest attempt” is the WPR.191 Passed in 1973 in the
aftermath of the Vietnam War and over President Richard Nixon’s
veto, the WPR includes reporting requirements when the president
introduces U.S. armed forces “into hostilities or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances” and where U.S. armed forces are deployed abroad
while “equipped for combat.”192 It also includes provisions related to
186. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 15, at 97 (“The division of authority [over war powers]
between the President and Congress is the most controversial and intractable issue in the
constitutional law of U.S. foreign relations.”); Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and
Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667, 1678 (2003) (“The meaning and scope of . . . [the
declare war power] is contested, especially in modern times when presidents have asserted
independent war powers more aggressively.”).
187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–14.
188. Id. art. II, § 2.
189. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 641
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
190. Id.
191. CURTIS A. BRADLEY, ASHLEY S. DEEKS & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 689 (7th ed. 2020).
192. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 4(a), 87 Stat. 555, 555–56 (1973) (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (2018)).
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congressional action. Most prominently, it includes a requirement that
within sixty days of the introduction of forces into hostilities, the
president shall terminate the use of such forces unless Congress has
declared war, authorized the use of such forces, extended the deadline,
or cannot meet due to an armed attack on the United States.193 In
addition to the specified deadline, however, the WPR specifies that
“any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities
outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories
without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such
forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by
concurrent resolution.”194
Because concurrent resolutions are not subject to presentment,
Chadha appears to invalidate this mechanism that Congress intended
to use to restrain presidential uses of force.195 After Chadha, Congress
enacted a statute providing a separate procedure to “force a vote to
order the withdrawal of troops.”196 The amended process uses a joint
resolution and so is subject to presentment and to presidential veto.197
Congress has rarely invoked the WPR, but it twice attempted to
require Trump to terminate hostilities.198 Congress’s first attempt came
in spring 2019, when both houses passed a joint resolution directing

193. Id. § 5(b), 87 Stat. at 556.
194. Id. § 5(c), 87 Stat. at 556–57.
195. See, e.g., BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 191, at 693 (“Most scholars believe that such a
concurrent resolution, if not presented to the President for signature and possible veto, is invalid
under INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).”); MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42699,
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 7–8 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
natsec/R42699.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8FR-YKKY] (discussing the concurrent resolution
provision and the effect of Chadha); see also id. at 66 (noting proposals to amend the WPR to
eliminate the concurrent resolution provision because of arguments that it is invalid after
Chadha).
196. FISHER, supra note 139, at 2; see 50 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (providing an expedited procedure
for congressional consideration of joint resolutions directing the removal of U.S. forces from
hostilities).
197. For an explanation of the differences between bills and joint, concurrent, and simple
resolutions, see Types of Legislation, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/
briefing/leg_laws_acts.htm [https://perma.cc/S6JN-KT3U].
198. Another recent attempt failed to pass the House. In 2015, representatives introduced a
concurrent resolution pursuant to the WPR that would have directed the Obama administration
to withdraw U.S. forces deployed to fight the Islamic State. See MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R43760, A NEW AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE
ISLAMIC STATE: ISSUES AND CURRENT PROPOSALS 8 (2017), https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/R/R43760/16 [https://perma.cc/6SBS-5VXE] (discussing H. Con. Res. 55). The House
Foreign Affairs Committee approved the resolution, but it failed to pass the House. Id.
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“the President to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities
in or affecting the Republic of Yemen” within thirty days of the
resolution’s enactment.199 The resolution specified that the relevant
“hostilities” included “in-flight refueling of non-United States aircraft
conducting missions as part of the ongoing civil war in Yemen.”200 And
it explicitly excepted U.S. armed forces “engaged in operations
directed at al Qaeda or associated forces.”201
Trump vetoed the resolution.202 In his veto message, Trump first
disputed the premise that there were hostilities to be terminated,
arguing the resolution was “unnecessary because, apart from
counterterrorism operations against al-Qa’ida in the Arabian
Peninsula and ISIS, the United States is not engaged in hostilities in or
affecting Yemen.”203 He then turned to constitutional claims. He called
the resolution “dangerous” and argued that “Congress should not seek
to prohibit certain tactical operations, such as in-flight refueling, or
require military engagements to adhere to arbitrary timelines” because
“[d]oing so would interfere with the President’s constitutional
authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.”204 The
constitutional claim echoed the Statement of Administration Policy
issued prior to the resolution’s passage.205 There, the administration
argued, “[b]ecause the President has directed United States forces to
support the Saudi-led coalition under his constitutional powers, the
joint resolution would raise serious constitutional concerns to the
199. S.J. Res. 7, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019); see Catie Edmondson, Senate Votes Again To End
Aid to Saudi War in Yemen, Defying Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2019), https://nyti.ms/
2TByCgB [https://perma.cc/9LHC-5HTB] (discussing the Senate vote as “rebuk[ing] President
Trump for his continued defense of Saudi Arabia after the killing of dissident journalist Jamal
Khashoggi”); Catie Edmondson, U.S. Role in Yemen War Will End Unless Trump Issues Second
Veto, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2WMyUOu [https://perma.cc/2UFD-YDK5]
(discussing the House’s passage of the resolution).
200. S.J. Res. 7, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019).
201. Id.
202. Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval Legislation Regarding the Removal
of United States Armed Forces from Hostilities in Yemen, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1
(Apr. 16, 2019).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION POLICY S.J. RES. 7 – DIRECTING THE PRESIDENT TO REMOVE UNITED
STATES ARMED FORCES FROM HOSTILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN THAT HAVE NOT
BEEN AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS (2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2019/03/sapsj7s_20190313.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBH6-DMLQ] [hereinafter YEMEN SAP]. See
generally supra note 105 (discussing SAPs).
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extent that it seeks to override the President’s determination as
Commander in Chief.”206 Congress failed to override the veto.207
Congress’s next attempt to rein in the Trump administration’s use
of war powers occurred in spring 2020. Amidst escalating tensions with
Iran, the Trump administration launched a drone strike to kill Iranian
Major General Qassem Soleimani at the Baghdad airport.208 As legal
authority, the executive invoked the 2002 Authorization for the Use of
Military Force (“AUMF”) against Iraq.209 Commentators and
congressmen pushed back, arguing, based in part on the Trump
administration’s own prior statements, that the 2002 AUMF on Iraq
does not authorize the use of force against Iran.210 Congress then
passed a joint resolution explicitly stating that neither the 2001 AUMF
passed in response to the 9/11 attacks nor the 2002 AUMF authorizes

206. YEMEN SAP, supra note 205 (addressing S.J. Res. 7).
207. See Roll Call Vote 116th Congress—1st Session, U.S. SENATE (2019), https://www.senate.gov/
legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=116&session=1&vote=00094 [https://
perma.cc/KAH8-87DL] (showing fifty-three votes in favor of overriding the veto of S.J. Res. 7, and
forty-five votes against, with two senators not voting).
208. See Michael Crowley, Falih Hassan & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Strike in Iraq Kills Qassim
Suleimani, Commander of Iranian Forces, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2020), https://nyti.ms/36iPzyp
[https://perma.cc/NR29-JEAJ] (describing the strike).
209. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, NOTICE ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS
GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY
OPERATIONS 1–2 (2020), https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/files/4/3/4362ca46-3a7d-43e8a3ec-be0245705722/6E1A0F30F9204E380A7AD0C84EC572EC.doc148.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2FVJ-DF56] (citing the 2002 Iraq AUMF as authorization for the Soleimani strike and arguing
“[t]he airstrike against Soleimani in Iraq is consistent with this longstanding interpretation of the
President’s authority under Article II [of the Constitution] and the 2002 AUMF”); see also Jean
Galbraith, U.S. Drone Strike in Iraq Kills Iranian Military Leader Qasem Soleimani, 114 AM. J.
INT’L L. 313, 318–20 (2020) (providing an overview of the Trump administration’s arguments
about its domestic legal authority for the Soleimani strike).
210. See, e.g., Catie Edmondson, Mike Lee, a G.O.P. Senator, Calls Administration’s Iran
Briefing ‘Insulting,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2FzJa6p [https://perma.cc/7XFG2JZZ] (reporting Senator Mike Lee’s pointed criticism of a Trump administration briefing on the
Soleimani strike); Ryan Goodman & Steve Vladeck, Why the 2002 AUMF Does Not Apply to
Iran, JUST SEC. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/67993/why-the-2002-aumf-does-notapply-to-iran [https://perma.cc/M4PF-AQNH] (citing prior statements by the Trump
administration recognizing that the 2002 AUMF does not authorize force against Iran and calling
it “beyond any reasonable interpretation” of the 2002 AUMF “that it applies to uses of force
against Iran in Iraq”); Ryan Goodman, White House ‘1264 Notice’ and Novel Legal Claims for
Military Action Against Iran, JUST SEC. (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68594/whitehouse-1264-notice-and-novel-legal-claims-for-military-action-against-iran [https://perma.cc/
6XDN-FLKQ] (calling the Trump administration’s claim in its notice to Congress that the 2002
AUMF authorizes the use of force against Iran “astonishing” and “highly flawed”).
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the use of force against Iran.211 The joint resolution further directed the
president to terminate “hostilities against the Islamic Republic of Iran
or any part of its government or military, unless explicitly authorized
by a declaration of war or specific authorization for use of military
force against Iran.”212 Trump vetoed the resolution.213 His veto message
argued both that the resolution was “unnecessary” because “the
United States is not engaged in the use of force against Iran,” and that
the Soleimani strike “was fully authorized under both the [2002
AUMF] . . . and the President’s constitutional authorities as
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive.”214
For Congress, voting against an ongoing presidential use of force
usually presents difficulties. There may be domestic political costs to
being perceived as voting against deployed troops. Individual members
have little incentive to defend the prerogatives of Congress as an
institution, causing collective action problems in the war powers arena,
just as in other areas where the separation of powers is at issue.215 For
these and other reasons, congressional votes—especially successful
majority votes of both houses—to terminate hostilities and withdraw

211. S.J. Res. 68, 116th Cong. § 1(3) (2020) (“The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
Force . . . against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attack and the Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 . . . do not serve as a specific statutory authorization for
the use of force against Iran.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Authorization for Use of
Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541
note (2018)) (authorizing the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons”); Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-243, § 3(a), 116 Stat. 1498 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note) (authorizing the president “to
use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in
order to—(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed
by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq”).
212. S.J. Res. 68, 116th Cong. § 2(a) (2020).
213. Iran Veto, supra note 3. Notably, the White House’s SAP on S.J. Res. 68 did not indicate
that the president would veto the joint resolution, but instead only that “his advisors would
recommend that he veto the joint resolution.” OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE
PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY S.J. RES. 68 – A JOINT RESOLUTION TO
DIRECT THE REMOVAL OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FROM HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN THAT HAVE NOT BEEN AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS 2 (Mar. 10,
2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/SAP_S.J.-RES.-68.pdf [https://
perma.cc/762G-DTV6] (emphasis omitted). This language reflects the weaker and more
uncertain version of a veto threat. See supra note 105 (discussing different levels of certainty in
SAP veto threat language).
214. Iran Veto, supra note 3.
215. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.

EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

THE YOUNGSTOWN CANON

2/23/2021 9:06 PM

1291

U.S. troops are likely to be rare. But what happens when they do
occur? If the president vetoes a bill or joint resolution terminating
hostilities, is congressional opposition irrelevant? The Youngstown
canon suggests no.
Use of the canon in the Yemen and Iran resolution situations is
triggered by the majority vote of Congress, blocked by a presidential
veto, coupled with underlying ambiguity in the scope of the president’s
war powers.216 In practice, application of the canon would mean that
the president’s authority to act—whether constitutional or statutory—
should be narrowly construed because of congressional opposition.
This might manifest as a narrowing of the type of actions the executive
could undertake, limiting executive actions to those clearly within
exclusive executive authority, such as defense assistance. Such might
be the case with respect to Yemen. Alternatively, applying the canon
could mean a temporal, geographic, or substantive limit on the
permissible targets for force. In the Iran case, as in many others over
the past two decades, presidents have cited the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs
and faced criticism for stretching the bounds of these statutory
authorizations.217 In a case like the strike against Soleimani, where a
president cites one of these statutory authorizations and Congress
216. Notably, the conditions for the canon’s application would not be met in circumstances
where the president has exclusive authority, not subject to regulation by Congress. The scope of
this category is debated, but it at least includes military action in self-defense. See, e.g., HENKIN,
supra note 15, at 47 (“In response to an attack upon the United States, the President has
constitutional authority to defend the United States.”).
217. In particular, the executive branch faced pushback for citing the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs
to justify the use of force against the Islamic State. See, e.g., Tess Bridgeman, Now Is the Time To
Repeal the 2002 AUMF, JUST SEC. (July 11, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64885/now-is-thetime-to-repeal-the-2002-aumf [https://perma.cc/PDS5-YQ4U] (arguing that Congress should
repeal the 2002 AUMF for several reasons, including that it is open to abuse via excessive
executive interpretations, such as suggestions by the Trump administration that it might
“authorize war with Iran”); Ryan Goodman, Sec. Kerry’s Difficult Defense of 2001 AUMF
Application to ISIL—And Senators’ Disbelief, JUST SEC. (Sept. 17, 2014), https://
www.justsecurity.org/15152/sec-kerrys-defense-2001-aumf-applies-isil-senators-disbelief [https://
perma.cc/VMS6-QYCN] (detailing congressional testimony by then-Secretary of State John
Kerry about the 2001 AUMF as the legal basis for the use of force against the Islamic State and
incredulity expressed by senators); Charlie Savage, Obama Sees Iraq Resolution as a Legal Basis
for Airstrikes, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1qQK14n [https://
perma.cc/7B8B-26CF] (reporting that the Obama administration viewed the 2002 AUMF as an
alternative legal basis—in addition to the 2001 AUMF—for the use of force against the Islamic
State). For an overview of how the executive branch has cited the 2001 AUMF as authority for
action, see generally, MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43983, 2001 AUTHORIZATION
FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE: ISSUES CONCERNING ITS CONTINUED APPLICATION (2015),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43983.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T5U-SWPX].

EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1292

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/23/2021 9:06 PM

[Vol. 70:1245

objects, the Youngstown canon instructs that courts, executive branch
lawyers, and other interpreters should narrowly construe the AUMF
in light of later, specific congressional opposition to interpreting it to
reach the use of force against Iran.218
As a normative matter, the use of the canon in war powers–related
situations follows from several of the grounds discussed above.219 War
powers is an area of shared constitutional responsibility where the
Framers, by dividing authority between the executive and the
legislature, intended the branches to act as mutual checks and
constraints. The Youngstown canon helps preserve this intent by
hampering presidents’ ability to stretch broad, ambiguous
congressional authorizations beyond their intended scope, while at the
same time using the veto to block congressional attempts to adjust or
repeal existing authorizations. The canon functions similarly in cases
where the president acts without any claimed congressional
authorization; there, the ambiguous powers being narrowly construed
would be constitutional ones.
Application of the Youngstown canon with respect to joint
resolutions related to the WPR might be further justified as addressing
bargains upset by Chadha. The WPR contemplated that Congress
could force the president to cease hostilities with a concurrent
resolution, which entails a majority vote of both houses and is not
subject to a veto.220 At times, the Department of Justice’s OLC has
treated the WPR—intended by Congress as a restraint on presidential
war powers—as effectively an authorization to the president or
recognition of the president’s authority to engage in short-term
hostilities without congressional approval.221 In its 2011 opinion on U.S.
involvement in Libya, OLC argued that in the WPR, “Congress . . .
implicitly recognized” presidential authority to enter into hostilities for
218. This is a second-best solution to having clear, precisely tailored AUMFs in the first place.
219. See supra Part I.C.
220. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
221. See BRADLEY ET AL., supra note 191, at 690 (explaining that the executive has construed
§ 5 of the WPR to “in effect authorize the President to engage in short-term military conflicts
without congressional authorization” and citing OLC opinions on Haiti and Libya). OLC cites
the WPR provision requiring the president to terminate hostilities within sixty days unless
Congress declares war, authorizes use of the armed forces, extends the deadline, or cannot meet
as a result of an armed attack. See Deployment of U.S. Armed Forced into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C.
173, 175 (1994) (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1994)). OLC has argued that, “This structure makes
sense only if the President may introduce troops into hostilities or potential hostilities without
prior authorization by the Congress . . . .” Id. at 175–76.
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periods shorter than sixty days without congressional authorization,222
and that “[b]y allowing United States involvement in hostilities to
continue for 60 or 90 days, Congress signaled in the WPR that it
considers congressional authorization most critical for ‘major,
prolonged conflicts such as the wars in Vietnam and Korea,’ not more
limited engagements.”223
Taking this highly questionable interpretation of the WPR on its
own terms renders the WPR another example of statutory delegations
disrupted by Chadha. In the WPR, Congress did not recognize the
president’s authority or authorize the president to engage in hostilities
without congressional approval; rather, it set a default rule that such
hostilities must automatically terminate unless a specified exception
applies or Congress passes a concurrent resolution requiring their
termination at an earlier time. OLC’s interpretation of the WPR as a
congressional concession fails to take into account that if Congress
intended to make such a concession or recognition at all, it did so only
on the understanding that it could police presidential uses of force
through concurrent resolutions not subject to presidential veto.
Chadha, of course, eliminated that possibility. But OLC has continued
to cite the potentially empowering portion of the WPR while ignoring
the manner in which Congress intended the WPR to function.
Following on the last point, it may be especially ironic, but also
important, to note that the main locus for interpretation of the WPR
and AUMFs is the executive branch.224 Courts generally do not
adjudicate questions of war powers due to problems with, for example,
standing, ripeness, and the political question doctrine.225 To be sure,

222. Auth. To Use Mil. Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. slip op. at 8 (Apr. 1, 2011).
223. Id. at 8–9 (quoting Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces into Haiti, supra note 221, at 176).
224. This situation may be particularly ironic with respect to the WPR, which Congress
enacted over a presidential veto. Cf. McNollgast, supra note 116, at 720 (“[I]f the President vetoed
the legislation, and both houses voted to override his veto, then the President’s preferences [in
interpreting the legislation] can be accorded no weight.”).
225. See, e.g., Bin Ali Jaber v. United States, 861 F.3d 241, 250 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (dismissing as
a political question a lawsuit challenging the legality of a U.S. drone strike in Yemen); Doe v.
Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 134–35 (1st Cir. 2003) (dismissing suit by military members and congressmen
seeking an injunction against Iraq War on the grounds that the case was not ripe); Campbell v.
Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (dismissing for lack of standing a challenge by
congressmen to U.S. participation in NATO forces’ actions in Yugoslavia). But see Hathaway,
supra note 118, at 93 (arguing that “one or both houses of Congress could challenge an act by the
executive branch that has concrete and particular injuries to their respective powers” or pass a
resolution to “authorize a congressional committee to sue for the same purpose,” and making the
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executive branch officials have a client—the president—but they have
also sworn an oath to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and they, just as much as courts, can use the Youngstown canon
when construing the Constitution and war powers–related statutes.226
B. Statutory Delegations Locked in by Chadha
The WPR was only one way that Congress tried to reclaim power
and exert oversight over the executive in the wake of the Vietnam War.
Another statute of the same vintage came to prominence in 2019 when
Trump declared a national emergency relating to the southern border
of the United States in an attempt to divert money to build a border
wall that Congress had declined to fund.227 The declaration put a
spotlight on the 1976 NEA, another statute that Congress designed to
rein in the president via use of concurrent resolutions. After Chadha,
congressional terminations of national emergencies can proceed only
through joint resolutions, which are subject to presidential veto.
Congress’s attempt to terminate Trump’s declaration of an emergency
at the southern border prompted the first veto of Trump’s presidency
and a wave of litigation.228
This Section highlights the NEA as an example of statutory
schemes disrupted by Chadha.229 It discusses the history and structure
of the NEA, provides an overview of the disputes over the southernborder declaration, and describes how the Youngstown canon may be
relevant to ongoing or future litigation about the use of emergency
powers pursuant to the NEA.
From the 1950s through the early 1970s, congressional concerns
grew about presidents’ continuation of national emergencies and
associated extraordinary exercises of power long after the events that
prompted the initial emergency declarations.230 By 1973 when a special
further point that “[a] similar technique” could be used to overcome the political question
doctrine).
226. See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text (discussing use of canons by the executive
branch).
227. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes a
Constitutional Clash, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2V2h1dT [https://perma.cc/
M4JX-L8D4].
228. See infra notes 249–55 and accompanying text.
229. For sources on other statutory schemes disrupted by Chadha, see supra note 139.
230. For an overview of the background of the National Emergencies Act (“NEA”), see L.
ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RES. SERV., RL98505, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 8 (2020),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/98-505.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN7L-QL98].
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congressional committee began investigating emergency powers, it
considered declarations issued in 1933, 1950, 1970, and 1971—all of
which were still in effect.231 In 1976, Congress passed and President
Gerald Ford signed the NEA.232 The statute dealt with existing national
emergencies by effectively requiring a new presidential emergency
declaration for continued use of the underlying emergency powers.233
It also “established an exclusive means for declaring a national
emergency” going forward, specifying that such declarations would
automatically expire after one year unless terminated by the president
or Congress or extended by the president.234
In the floor debate over the NEA, Senator Frank Church, who
cochaired the Senate committee that drafted the bill,235 invoked
Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence.236 Church noted:
[O]ur legislation will constitute the exclusive authority for the
exercise of Presidential powers in an emergency. The Congress
having acted, the President’s power will be, in Justice Jackson’s
words, “at its lowest ebb.” In the future, every type and class of
presidentially declared emergency will be subject to congressional
control.237

He explained that “nothing in this bill would interfere with the
President’s right to declare a national emergency in the future or
deprive him of the necessary power to cope with such an
emergency.”238 Rather, the underlying statutes granting the president
“emergency powers remain on the shelf, to be pulled off and used as
may be required in order to deal with some future crisis.”239 However,
he continued, “the procedures governing the use of emergency powers
in the future will always be subject to congressional review and any
declaration of an emergency may be terminated by a concurrent

231. Id. at 7.
232. National Emergencies Act, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–51 (2018)).
233. See HALCHIN, supra note 230, at 10 (describing the NEA); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1601
(addressing “Termination of Existing Declared Emergencies”).
234. HALCHIN, supra note 230, at 11; see also 50 U.S.C. §§ 1621–22, 1631 (addressing
processes for declaration and termination of national emergencies). For a list of all emergencies
declared pursuant to the NEA, see HALCHIN, supra note 230, at 11–16.
235. HALCHIN, supra note 230, at 7.
236. 122 CONG. REC. 28,227 (1976) (statement of Sen. Frank Church).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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resolution of the Congress,” leaving Congress “in a position to assert
its ultimate authority.”240
This envisioned structure, however, was not to be. Chadha
effectively rendered this process invalid. In 1985, in Chadha’s wake,
Congress amended the NEA to replace the concurrent resolution
provision with one requiring a joint resolution for terminating national
emergencies.241
The Trump administration’s use of the NEA showed just how
consequential this shift was. Trump’s declaration of a national
emergency related to the southern U.S. border followed months of
dispute with Congress about funding construction of the border wall.
The impasse between the branches over Congress’s refusal to
appropriate $5.7 billion that Trump had requested for border wall
construction sparked a monthlong government shutdown from
December 2018 into January 2019.242 In February 2019, Congress
passed and the president signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
FY2019, which provided only $1.375 billion “for the construction of
primary pedestrian fencing . . . in the Rio Grande Valley Sector.”243 The
same day he signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, Trump
issued a proclamation “declar[ing] that a national emergency exists at
240. Id.
241. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, § 801, 99 Stat. 405, 448
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1622 (2018)). Compare National Emergencies Act, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1602) (“(a) Any national emergency declared by the President in
accordance with this title shall terminate if—(1) Congress terminates the emergency by
concurrent resolution; or (2) the President issues a proclamation terminating the emergency.”),
with 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (“Any national emergency declared by the President in accordance with
this subchapter shall terminate if—(1) there is enacted into law a joint resolution terminating the
emergency; or (2) the President issues a proclamation terminating the emergency.”).
242. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Emily Cochrane, Government Shuts Down as Talks Fail To
Break Impasse, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2GzEfWo [https://perma.cc/2QVUGB27] (explaining that the shutdown began “after congressional and White House officials failed
to find a compromise on a spending bill that hinged on President Trump’s demands for $5.7 billion
for a border wall”); Nicholas Fandos, Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Peter Baker, Trump Signs Bill
Reopening Government for 3 Weeks in Surprise Retreat from Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://nyti.ms/2S2Wx6Y [https://perma.cc/AZV8-MMTT] (explaining that the government
shutdown ended with a stopgap spending bill allowing the government to reopen while
negotiations continued between Congress and the executive over border wall funding).
243. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6, div. A, § 230(a)(1), 133 Stat.
13, 28; see also id. div. D, § 739, 133 Stat. at 82 (prohibiting the use of appropriated funds “to
increase, eliminate, or reduce funding for a program, project, or activity as proposed in the
President’s budget request” unless “such proposed change is subsequently enacted in an
appropriation Act, or . . . made pursuant to the reprogramming or transfer provisions of this or
any other appropriations Act”).
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the southern border of the United States,”244 citing the border as “a
major entry point for criminals, gang members, and illicit narcotics”
and a “problem of large-scale unlawful migration.”245 The
proclamation declared that the “emergency requires use of the Armed
Forces” and invoked, among other things, authority provided by 10
U.S.C. § 2808,246 which in turn allows the secretary of defense to
“undertake military construction projects . . . not otherwise authorized
by law that are necessary to support such use of the armed forces.”247
The White House asserted that the proclamation made available $3.6
billion from military construction funds pursuant to § 2808, plus
additional funds from other sources, for a total of $8.1 billion available
for border-wall construction.248
Congress responded by passing a joint resolution pursuant to the
NEA declaring the national emergency to be terminated.249 Trump,
predictably, vetoed the resolution,250 as well as a subsequent resolution
along the same lines.251

244. Proclamation No. 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 20, 2019).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a) (2018). The section further specifies, “Such projects may be
undertaken only within the total amount of funds that have been appropriated for military
construction, including funds appropriated for family housing, that have not been obligated.” Id.
248. Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump’s Border Security Victory, WHITE HOUSE (Feb.
15, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-bordersecurity-victory [https://perma.cc/J8DS-N2GY].
249. H.R.J. Res. 46, 116th Cong. (2019). The NEA provides for expedited procedures of
legislative consideration of joint resolutions terminating emergencies, and these provisions
remained in effect after the shift from concurrent to joint resolutions. See HALCHIN, supra note
230, at 19–20.
250. Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval Legislation To
Terminate the National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the United States, 2019
DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Mar. 15, 2019) (calling H.J. Res. 46 “a dangerous resolution that
would undermine United States sovereignty and threaten the lives and safety of countless
Americans”).
251. A Joint Resolution Relating to a National Emergency Declared by the President on
February 15, 2019, S.J. Res. 54, 116th Cong. (2019); Message Returning Without Approval
Legislation To Terminate the National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the
United States, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Oct. 15, 2019) (asserting that “the situation on
our southern border remains a national emergency, and our Armed Forces are still needed to
help confront it”). The NEA requires Congress to consider a joint resolution to terminate a
national emergency every six months. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b) (2018) (“Not later than six months after
a national emergency is declared, and not later than the end of each six-month period thereafter
that such emergency continues, each House of Congress shall meet to consider a vote on a joint
resolution to determine whether that emergency shall be terminated.”).

EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1298

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/23/2021 9:06 PM

[Vol. 70:1245

The emergency proclamation and repurposing of funds for border
wall construction prompted a number of lawsuits.252 The cases raise
multiple questions of statutory interpretation, including, for example,
whether there is a national emergency that “requires the use of the
armed forces,”253 whether transfer of funds previously appropriated for
other purposes to border wall construction is “based on unforeseen
military requirements,”254 whether border wall construction projects
constitute “military construction projects,” and, if so, whether they are
“necessary to support [the] use of the armed forces.”255
Along with other principles of statutory construction, the
Youngstown canon can assist in resolving these or similar interpretive
questions that might arise. To the extent that there is ambiguity about
the existence or scope of the president’s authority, the Youngstown
canon’s triggering conditions are met: Congress has attempted—
multiple times—to terminate the national emergency, but has been
thwarted by presidential vetoes. The Youngstown canon therefore
counsels in favor of narrowly construing the scope of presidential
authority. In particular cases, this could mean narrowly construing, for
example, the meaning of “national emergency,” which is undefined in

252. See, e.g., California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926, 950 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub. nom.
Trump v. Sierra Club, No. 20-138, 2020 WL 6121565 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2020) (holding that the transfer
of funds for construction of the border wall was unlawful); Sierra Club v. Trump, 963 F.3d 874,
886–87 (9th Cir. 2020) (same), cert. granted, No. 20-138, 2020 WL 6121565 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2020);
El Paso Cnty. v. Trump, 982 F.3d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that El Paso County and the
Border Network for Human Rights lack standing to challenge use of funds for border wall
construction); U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (petition
for rehearing en banc pending).
253. See, e.g., Brief of the U.S. House of Representatives at 47–48, Mnuchin, 976 F.3d 1 (No.
19-5176) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a) (2018)).
254. Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education
Appropriations Act of 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-245,
§ 8005, 132 Stat. 2981, 2999 (2018); see, e.g., California v. Trump, 963 F.3d at 944–48 (holding that
construction of the border wall was neither “unforeseen” nor related to a “military
requirement”).
255. 10 U.S.C. § 2808; see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d 853, 879 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding
that § 2808 does not authorize the border wall construction projects because “they are neither
necessary to support the use of the armed forces, nor are they military construction projects”).
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the NEA,256 or terms in underlying emergency powers statutes, such as
“military construction project[].”257
The Ninth Circuit did just that in Sierra Club v. Trump.258 Citing
this Article, the court rejected the Trump administration’s claim that
§ 2808 authorizes border wall construction.259 The court did not identify
ambiguity in the statutory language, but nonetheless explained that
“[p]articularly . . . where Congress declined to fund the very projects at
issue and attempted to terminate the declaration of a national
emergency (twice), we cannot interpret the statute to give the
Executive Branch unfettered discretion to divert funds to any land it
deems under military jurisdiction.”260 The court reasoned that “[h]ere,
though imperfectly, Congress has made clear that it does not support
extensive border wall construction . . . and therefore, the existing

256. See Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court’s Contribution to the Confrontation over
Emergency Powers, LAWFARE (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-courtscontribution-confrontation-over-emergency-powers [https://perma.cc/QQL9-HFCZ] (noting
that when Congress passed the NEA with a concurrent resolution provision for terminating
national emergencies, “[a]ttempting to define ‘emergencies’ in advance was . . . not as pressing a
concern, because Congress could decide, after a presidential declaration of emergency, whether
it agreed”); cf. Ilya Somin, Why Trump’s Emergency Declaration Is Illegal, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Feb. 23, 2019, 5:35 PM), https://reason.com/2019/02/23/why-trumps-emergency-declaration-isille [https://perma.cc/3TCZ-3NSS] (arguing that the ordinary meaning of “emergency” should
constrain the president’s discretion in declaring an emergency).
257. 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a).
258. Sierra Club v. Trump, 977 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2020).
259. Id. at 887 n.12.
260. Id. at 887. The court made a similar point in rejecting the Trump administration’s
proposed interpretation of “necessary” in § 2808. See id. at 881 (“That Congress declined to
provide more substantial funding for border wall construction and voted twice to terminate the
President’s declaration of a national emergency underscores that the border wall is not, in fact,
required or needed.”). The same panel also referenced the vetoed joint resolution in an earlier
opinion, holding that the Department of Defense lacked authority to transfer previously
appropriated funds for use in border wall construction because Congress had authorized such
transfers “only in response to an ‘unforeseen military requirement.’” California v. Trump, 963
F.3d 946, 944 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub. nom. Trump v. Sierra Club, No. 20-138, 2020 WL
6121565 (U.S. Oct. 19, 2020) (quoting Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2019, Pub.
L. No. 115-245, § 8005, 132 Stat. 2981, 2999 (2018)). In construing “unforeseen,” the court noted,
“Congress’s joint resolution terminating the President’s declaration of a national emergency only
reinforces this point: there was no unanticipated crisis at the border.” Id. at 945. The majority’s
reference to the vetoed joint resolution prompted an objection from the dissent. See id. at 973
n.23 (Collins, J., dissenting) (“Congress’s joint resolutions attempting to terminate the emergency
declaration are irrelevant for the further reason that they were vetoed and never became law.”
(citation omitted)).
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statutory authority provided by Section 2808 must be construed
narrowly.”261
The canon could also interact with executive claims that its actions
are authorized by Congress and that they therefore fall within
Youngstown Category One.262 To the extent that tools of statutory
interpretation, including the Youngstown canon, suggest that the
president’s actions do not fall within the scope of activities authorized
by the NEA or underlying emergency powers statutes, courts should
conclude that the president is in Youngstown Category Two—the zone
of twilight—or even Category Three—where his power is at its lowest
ebb. Pushing back on the scope of congressional authorizations and
shifting out of Youngstown Category One eliminates the executive’s
reliance on “the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of
judicial interpretation” that attend Category One actions.263
The NEA is a good case for considering congressional opposition
blocked by vetoes because of Chadha’s disruptive effect. Chadha
essentially created a one-way ratchet: Congress left prior delegations
of emergency powers on the books when it passed the NEA because it
believed it could claw back such delegations with concurrent
resolutions as needed.264 But Chadha rendered that plan impossible.
Now, the only way to pull back emergency powers is with presidential
agreement or a supermajority of Congress.265 In the meantime, the
Youngstown canon provides a way to give bicameral attempts to rein
in presidential excesses some interpretive effect, without running afoul
of Chadha.

261. Sierra Club, 977 F.3d at 887.
262. See, e.g., Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 27–
28, Sierra Club v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 883 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 4:19-cv-00892) (arguing that
the president’s actions were authorized by Congress and therefore fell within Youngstown
Category One).
263. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
264. See supra note 236 and accompanying text (quoting Sen. Frank Church).
265. For an overview of proposals to reform presidential emergency powers, including NEA
reform proposals that have garnered bipartisan support, see Elizabeth Goitein, Good Governance
Paper No. 18: Reforming Emergency Powers, JUST SEC. (Oct. 31, 2020), https://
www.justsecurity.org/73196/good-governance-paper-no-18-emergency-powers [https://perma.cc/
SL6J-6J74].

EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

THE YOUNGSTOWN CANON

2/23/2021 9:06 PM

1301

C. Congressional Action to Block Treaty Terminations
The Trump administration reinvigorated debates about another
unsettled area of constitutional law—whether the president has
authority to withdraw from or terminate international agreements
unilaterally. The Trump administration withdrew or announced its
intention to withdraw the United States from numerous international
agreements,266 including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty,267 the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular
Rights with Iran,268 the Paris Climate Agreement,269 the Treaty on

266. See Harold Hongju Koh, Presidential Power To Terminate International Agreements, 128
YALE L.J. F. 432, 433–34 (2018) [hereinafter Koh, Presidential Power] (documenting agreements
from which the Trump administration announced its withdrawal or threatened to withdraw); see
also Harold Hongju Koh, Could the President Unilaterally Terminate All International
Agreements?, in THE RESTATEMENT AND BEYOND: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF U.S.
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 67, 67 & n.1 (Paul B. Stephan & Sarah H. Cleveland eds., 2020)
[hereinafter Koh, Unilaterally Terminate] (providing an updated list of agreements from which
the Trump administration withdrew or threatened to withdraw). I use “international agreement”
to refer to agreements that are binding between states as a matter of international law and
“treaties” to refer to the subset of such agreements that have undergone the Article II process of
approval by two-thirds of the Senate and ratification by the president. I use the terms
“withdrawal” and “termination” interchangeably to refer to a U.S. exit from any international
agreement; technically however, exit of one or both parties from a bilateral international
agreement would “terminate” such agreement, whereas exit of one party from a multilateral
international agreement would constitute “withdrawal” rather than “termination,” as the
multilateral agreement would continue in force for the remaining states parties. Cf. Koh,
Presidential Power, supra, at 435 n.8 (“When one or two partners lawfully terminate or abrogate
a bilateral agreement, it is dead. But when one partner lawfully withdraws from, or abrogates its
legal duties to comply with, a multilateral treaty, the agreement continues, minus that partner.”).
267. Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, U.S. Withdrawal from the INF
Treaty on Aug. 2, 2019 (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.state.gov/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-inf-treatyon-august-2-2019 [https://perma.cc/A4CE-JBS4] (announcing that the United States provided
notice of its intent to withdraw pursuant to the treaty).
268. See Edward Wong & David E. Sanger, U.S. Withdraws from 1955 Treaty Normalizing
Relations with Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2OvJFo8 [https://perma.cc/MHC2BGYW] (discussing the withdrawal). On the same day, National Security Advisor John Bolton
announced that the United States would withdraw from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. See Roberta Rampton, Lesley Wroughton & Stephanie van
den Berg, U.S. Withdraws from International Accords, Says U.N. World Court ‘Politicized,’
REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-diplomacy-treaty/u-s-reviewingagreements-that-expose-it-to-world-court-bolton-idUSKCN1MD2CP [https://perma.cc/KP7LCFUE] (discussing the announcement).
269. Media Note, Off. of the Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, Communication Regarding
Intent To Withdraw from Paris Agreement (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.state.gov/communicationregarding-intent-to-withdraw-from-paris-agreement [https://perma.cc/JTK4-BQZQ] (stating
that the United States communicated to the United Nations its “intent to withdraw from the Paris
Agreement as soon as it is eligible to do so, consistent with the terms of the Agreement”).
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Open Skies,270 and membership in the World Health Organization.271
With a demonstrated willingness to terminate treaties and withdraw
the United States from international agreements, the Trump
administration’s periodic suggestions that it might pull the United
States out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”)—the
30-nation military alliance established in 1949 to counter the Soviet
Union272—triggered particular alarm in Congress. Congressmen
introduced several bills to prevent the president from withdrawing
from NATO absent congressional consent. For example, Senate Joint
Resolution Four, reported favorably by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in December 2019,273 specifies, “The President shall not
suspend, terminate, or withdraw the United States from the North
Atlantic Treaty, . . . except by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, provided that two thirds of the Senators present concur, or
pursuant to an Act of Congress.”274

270. Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, U.S. Sec’y of State, On the Treaty on Open Skies
(May 21, 2020), https://www.state.gov/on-the-treaty-on-open-skies [https://perma.cc/69QP-PB3L]
(announcing the U.S. intent to withdraw from the treaty); see also David E. Sanger, Trump Will
Withdraw from Open Skies Arms Control Treaty, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2020), https://nyti.ms/
3bQyePt [https://perma.cc/5HTF-9NDA] (discussing the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies
treaty).
271. Katie Rogers & Apoorva Mandavilli, Trump Administration Signals Formal Withdrawal
from W.H.O., N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2VYH5JT [https://perma.cc/JN2NSHGV] (reporting that the United States transmitted a “notice of withdrawal, effective July 6,
2021” to the World Health Organization (“WHO”)). But see Harold Hongju Koh, Trump’s Empty
“Withdrawal” from the World Health Organization, JUST SEC. (May 30, 2020) [hereinafter Koh,
Trump’s Empty Withdrawal], https://www.justsecurity.org/70493/trumps-empty-withdrawalfrom-the-world-health-organization [https://perma.cc/AY8R-EFHN] (explaining the numerous
hurdles or potential hurdles to actual withdrawal).
272. What is NATO?, NATO, https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html [https://
perma.cc/NLX8-GTZW].
273. All Actions, S.J. Res. 4 — 116th Congress (2019–2020), CONGRESS.GOV [hereinafter All
Actions, S.J. Res. 4], https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/4/allactions [https://perma.cc/PAU3-LVKX].
274. S.J. Res. 4, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019). A somewhat similar bill—the “NATO Support Act”—
was introduced in and passed the House. H.R. 676, 116th Cong. (2019). The NATO Support Act
expresses “the sense of Congress that . . . the President shall not withdraw the United States from
NATO” and “Goldwater v. Carter is not controlling legal precedent,” and states that it is U.S.
policy to “remain a member in good standing of NATO,” while also prohibiting the use of funds
to withdraw from NATO. Id. §§ 3–5. The bill “appear[s] to be designed to prohibit the president
from withdrawing from” NATO, though the prohibition is less clear than that in S.J. Res. 4. See
Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Constitutional Issues Relating to the NATO Support Act,
LAWFARE (Jan. 28, 2019, 7:43 AM) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Constitutional Issues],
https://www.lawfareblog.com/constitutional-issues-relating-nato-support-act [https://perma.cc/
M3MU-5XAC] (discussing the differences in the bills’ provisions); see also No NATO
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Trump’s unilateral treaty withdrawals and the putative
congressional opposition, at least to the NATO withdrawal, implicate
unsettled questions about the Constitution’s allocation of treaty
termination authority. The Constitution specifies how treaties are
made,275 but says nothing about how they may be terminated.276 The
issue came to a head in 1978 when President Jimmy Carter acted
unilaterally to terminate a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan as part
of the process of recognizing the People’s Republic of China, and a
group of senators filed suit to challenge the treaty termination.277 The
Supreme Court failed to resolve the constitutional question in
Goldwater v. Carter,278 delivering a set of fractured opinions, none of
which garnered a majority.279 A four-Justice plurality opinion by
Justice William Rehnquist considered the case to present a
nonjusticiable political question.280 Despite the fact that it is not
binding precedent, the Rehnquist opinion has cast a long shadow,
causing lower courts to dismiss several subsequent attempts to
Withdrawal Act, H.R. 6530, 115th Cong. (2018) (including provisions similar to the NATO
Support Act); Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2018, S. 3336, 115th
Cong. § 102 (2018) (prohibiting the use of appropriated funds to effectuate NATO withdrawal
absent passage by two-thirds of the Senate of a resolution “advising and consenting to the
withdrawal of the United States from the treaty”). The 2020 National Defense Authorization Act
included a provision stating, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be
obligated, expended, or otherwise made available” from the act’s passage through “December 31,
2020, to take any action to suspend, terminate, or provide notice of denunciation of the North
Atlantic Treaty, done at Washington, D.C. on April 4, 1949.” National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 1242, 133 Stat. 1198, 1656 (2019). The fact that the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee favorably reported the clearer withdrawal ban on the same
day that the full Senate adopted the above provision of the NDAA may suggest that the
Committee is not confident that the NDAA’s funding ban is sufficient to prohibit withdrawal.
Compare All Actions, S.J. Res. 4, supra note 273 (showing committee passage on Dec. 17, 2019),
with All Actions, S. 1790 — 116th Congress (2019–2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/senate-bill/1790/actions [https://perma.cc/LA32-MLWB] (showing Senate agreement to
the conference report on Dec. 17, 2019).
275. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the president “shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur”).
276. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 313 cmt. b (AM.
L. INST. 2018) (“The text of the Constitution . . . does not specify how the United States is to
suspend, terminate, or withdraw from treaties.”); Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treaty Termination and
the Separation of Powers, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 247, 252 (2013) [hereinafter Eichensehr, Treaty
Termination] (discussing the Constitution’s silence on treaty termination).
277. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 699–701 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc).
278. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
279. See id. at 997.
280. Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
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challenge unilateral presidential treaty terminations as political
questions.281
In the absence of definitive resolution by the courts, practice has,
unsurprisingly, shifted in favor of presidents terminating treaties
unilaterally. Prior to the twentieth century, the practice was
considerably more mixed.282 Presidents terminated treaties with
authorization from Congress as a whole and sometimes from the
Senate alone,283 and the first unilateral presidential termination did not
occur until 1899.284 In recent decades, however, the president has
exercised termination authority unilaterally,285 often with little
controversy.286 This historical practice led the recent Restatement
(Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States to conclude
that “the President has the authority to act on behalf of the United
States in suspending or terminating U.S. treaty commitments and in
withdrawing the United States from treaties,” at least so long as he
does so “either on the basis of terms in the treaty allowing for such

281. See Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2–3, 18 (D.D.C. 2002) (dismissing challenge to
unilateral presidential withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as a nonjusticiable
political question); Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1192–93, 1199 (D. Mass.
1986) (dismissing a challenge to Reagan’s unilateral termination of a Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation Treaty with Nicaragua as a political question).
282. See Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773,
788–801 (2014) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Termination] (providing an account of U.S. treaty
termination practice from the founding through the early twentieth century). The Reporters’
Notes to the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States provide a
concise overview of congressional involvement in U.S. treaty terminations through the early
twentieth century and the shift to unilateral presidential terminations in the twentieth century.
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 313, reporters’ notes 2-3
(AM. L. INST. 2018).
283. See TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED
STATES SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 106-71, at 202–06 (Jan. 2001) (cataloguing examples of treaty
terminations with prior or subsequent approval of Congress or the Senate); Bradley, Treaty
Termination, supra note 282, at 788–96 (cataloguing examples of presidents terminating treaties
pursuant to ex ante or occasionally ex post authorization from Congress or the Senate).
284. See Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra note 282, at 798–99 (dating the first unilateral
presidential termination to the McKinley administration’s termination of “certain clauses in an
1850 commercial treaty with Switzerland” in 1899).
285. See id. at 801–20 (describing the shift in the twentieth century toward unilateral
presidential terminations); see also Jean Galbraith, Treaty Termination as Foreign Affairs
Exceptionalism, 92 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 121, 127–28 (2014) (highlighting the dramatic nature
of the shift in practice and questioning whether it can thus properly be described as “historical
gloss”).
286. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELS. L. OF THE U.S. § 313 cmt. c (AM. L.
INST. 2018).
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action (such as a withdrawal clause) or on the basis of international law
that would justify such action.”287
But recognizing the practical reality of the president’s authority to
terminate treaties is not the same as saying that the president possesses
an exclusive—and thus preclusive—power to terminate all treaties in
all circumstances. Indeed, scholarly views since Goldwater have moved
toward the idea that the question of constitutional authority over
termination cannot be answered in general. Rather, whether the
president may unilaterally terminate an international agreement may
depend, for example, on whether the termination complies with
international law,288 the manner in which the agreement was
concluded,289 and, importantly, whether Congress has acted to restrain
the president’s authority to terminate unilaterally.290 To date, Congress
has not acted definitively to restrict the president’s unilateral

287. Id. § 313(1). But see Koh, Unilaterally Terminate, supra note 266, at 73 (criticizing the
Restatement’s characterization that “established” practice supports presidential termination
authority).
288. Importantly, the Restatement bakes this condition into its general rule that the president
can unilaterally terminate international agreements, noting that the president may act to
terminate when he does so in accordance with a treaty or other international law. See supra note
286 and accompanying text.
289. See Koh, Presidential Power, supra note 266, at 435–36 (arguing that treaty termination
“cannot be addressed by a single rule that purports to be ‘transsubstantive,’ in the sense of
governing the mechanics of withdrawal, suspension, or termination of national participation from
each and every international agreement addressing every subject matter” and arguing instead that
“absent exceptional circumstances, the degree of congressional participation constitutionally
required to exit any particular agreement should mirror the degree of congressional participation
that was required to enter that agreement in the first place”).
290. See, e.g., Eichensehr, Treaty Termination, supra note 276, at 279–86 (proposing that
Congress could impose a “for-cause” restriction on treaty termination); see also Jean
Galbraith, The President’s Power To Withdraw the United States from International Agreements
at Present and in the Future, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 445, 448 (2018) (“[T]he Senate could condition
its advice and consent to a treaty on legislative approval of withdrawal or on for-cause
justifications; Congress could do the same with respect to an ex post congressional-executive
agreement . . . .” (footnote omitted)); infra notes 294–96 and accompanying text (discussing
various ways Congress could limit the president’s authority to withdraw from NATO).

EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1306

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/23/2021 9:06 PM

[Vol. 70:1245

termination authority.291 Indeed, in Goldwater v. Carter,292 the D.C.
Circuit, which upheld President Carter’s unilateral termination of the
Mutual Defense Treaty prior to the Supreme Court’s review,
highlighted that:
The Senate, in the course of giving its consent, exhibited no purpose
and took no action to reserve a role for itself—by amendment,
reservation, or condition—in the effectuation of this provision.
Neither has the Senate, since the giving of the notice of termination,
purported to take any final or decisive action with respect to it, either
by way of approval or disapproval.293

What if Congress did act? Let’s take a restriction on NATO
withdrawal as an example. If Congress were to pass one of the bills
prohibiting unilateral presidential withdrawal from NATO and the bill
were to become law, Congress would shift a president who
subsequently withdrew from NATO from Youngstown Category Two
to Category Three.294 In other words, if Congress enacted a prohibition
on terminating NATO, “it would . . . substantially alter the calculus on
whether Trump can withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty.”295 As
Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have explained, “The
question posed by an enacted [statute prohibiting NATO withdrawal]
is whether the president’s power to terminate is exclusive, which would
291. Congress came close in 2019, passing a statutory provision requiring congressional
notification at least 120 days before the United States would provide formal notice of U.S. intent
to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty. See Jean Galbraith, United States Gives Notice of
Withdrawal from Treaty on Open Skies, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 779, 782–83 (2020) (describing and
citing the statutory provision, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L.
No. 116-92, § 1234, 133 Stat. 1198 (2019)). The Trump administration disregarded the notice
requirement, id. at 783, and the U.S. withdrawal from the treaty became final in November 2020,
see Paulina Firozi, Trump Administration Exits Open Skies Treaty, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2020/11/22/trump-administration-exits-openskies-treaty [https://perma.cc/QL2B-NMVJ].
292. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
293. Id. at 699.
294. In a recent article, Professor Harold Hongju Koh notes the possibilities of Congress
enacting “general laws prospectively limiting the President’s discretion to unilaterally terminate
all Article II treaties and congressional agreements” or “adopt[ing] specific statutes limiting . . .
executive discretion with respect to particularly important named treaties” and argues that
“[e]ither kind of legislative enactment would place any such unilateral termination into
Youngstown Category Three.” Koh, Presidential Power, supra note 266, at 479. Koh also notes in
the alternative that “the Senate could impose a reservation, understanding, or declaration on new
or existing treaties, limiting future efforts at unilateral presidential terminations unless the
termination is plainly ‘for cause.’” Id.
295. Bradley & Goldsmith, Constitutional Issues, supra note 274.
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mean that he could terminate a treaty even in the face of a restrictive
congressional directive” and even in Youngstown Category Three.296
But these analyses assume that a NATO (or other treaty)
withdrawal prohibition becomes enacted law, either via presidential
signature or through presidential veto followed by congressional
override.297 What happens if Congress passes a NATO withdrawal
prohibition by a majority vote of both houses, the president vetoes the
bill, and Congress fails to override the veto? Is Congress’s opposition
then rendered a constitutional nullity? The Youngstown canon
suggests not. As the discussion above demonstrates, the underlying
allocation of constitutional authority over treaty termination is
ambiguous and unsettled, which triggers application of the
Youngstown canon. Thus, the authority of the president to withdraw
the United States from NATO should be narrowly construed.
Unlike Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II),298 where President
Barack Obama acted in defiance of an enacted statute,299 the president
would be acting in defiance of unperfected congressional opposition—
that is, in defiance of a bill that did not become law because of a
presidential veto and Congress’s failure to override. The president
would therefore not officially be in Youngstown Category Three as
Obama was in Zivotofsky II, but the constitutional analysis would be
similar. A court or executive branch lawyer evaluating the unilateral
withdrawal from NATO would have to specify the scope of the

296. Id.; see also Bradley, Treaty Termination, supra note 282, at 824 (noting that if treaty
termination is “a concurrent power shared with either the full Congress or the Senate, then either
Congress or the Senate could potentially place limitations on it” and a president defying such
limitations would fall within Youngstown Category Three); Curtis A. Bradley, Exiting
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 67 DUKE L.J. 1615, 1644 (2018) (“If termination is, as it
appears to be, a concurrent rather than exclusive power, Congress can regulate it.”).
297. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Constitutional Issues, supra note 274 (“We cannot imagine
Trump signing the NATO Support Act into law. But the bill passed in the House by a margin
sufficient to override a veto, and the bill in the Senate might have similar support.”).
298. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
299. Congress passed the statute at issue—the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Year 2003—but in signing it into law, Bush issued a signing statement declaring that if the relevant
provision allowing U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem to have their passports list their place of birth
as “Jerusalem, Israel” was “mandatory rather than advisory,” it would “‘impermissibly interfere
with the President’s constitutional authority to formulate the position of the United States, speak
for the Nation in international affairs, and determine the terms on which recognition is given to
foreign states.” See id. at 2082 (quoting Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1698 (Sept. 30, 2002)).

EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1308

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/23/2021 9:06 PM

[Vol. 70:1245

president’s termination power as to this particular treaty. And the odds
seem stacked against the president.
NATO termination would not involve the president’s
constitutional power over recognition of foreign sovereigns, an
authority derived from the power to “receive Ambassadors”300 and one
that the Supreme Court in Zivotofsky II held was exclusive to the
president.301 Zivotofsky II suggests that the president may have power
to terminate treaties incident to recognition decisions, like Carter’s
termination of the Taiwan treaty in conjunction with recognizing the
People’s Republic of China, but the Court declined the executive
branch’s invitation to acknowledge a broader exclusive foreign affairs
power.302 Instead, the Court explained that “[t]he Curtiss–Wright case
does not extend so far as the Secretary suggests,” and that “[a]
formulation broader than the rule that the President alone determines
what nations to formally recognize as legitimate—and that he
consequently controls his statements on matters of recognition—
presents different issues and is unnecessary to the resolution of this
case.”303 Moreover, the North Atlantic Treaty was concluded as an
Article II treaty, requiring advice and consent by two-thirds of the
Senate304 and suggesting an understanding by the executive that mutual
defense is an area shared by Congress and the executive, as befitting a
legislature empowered to declare war, provide and maintain armed
forces, and make rules for such armed forces.305 The Youngstown canon
provides a principled rationale to justify narrowly construing the
president’s authority to terminate NATO in light of this constellation
of factors. A scenario in which Congress has tried to object to the
president’s actions but is prevented from fully perfecting that
opposition is not one in which courts should broadly construe
presidential power.
Recent doctrinal shifts suggest that courts might be prepared to
adjudicate the merits of future treaty termination cases. In Zivotofsky

300. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (specifying that the president “shall receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers”).
301. Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2088 (“[A] fair reading of the cases shows that the President’s
role in the recognition process is both central and exclusive.”).
302. Id. at 2089.
303. Id.
304. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34
U.N.T.S. 243.
305. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–14.
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v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I),306 the Supreme Court narrowed the political
question doctrine in a way that strongly suggests that the
constitutionality of treaty termination is now justiciable.307 Zivotofsky I
focused solely on the first two prongs of the political question doctrine
set out in Baker v. Carr,308 namely the existence of a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of an issue to a coordinate
political department and a lack of judicially discoverable or
manageable standards.309 The opinion ignored and apparently demoted
or eliminated the other Baker factors, including “an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.”310 Rehnquist’s opinion in
Goldwater was not clear about which of the Baker factors the Justices
believed treaty termination to implicate.311 To the extent that
subsequent courts believe that treaty termination involves only the
later (and lesser) Baker factors, Zivotofsky I suggests that courts
should decide the merits of the treaty termination question.
In light of this analysis, executive branch lawyers should also
consider congressional action in opposition to treaty termination in
analyzing whether the president may proceed with a termination.
Congressional opposition—even if not expressed in a veto override—
should matter to executive branch lawyers’ assessment of the scope of
their client’s constitutional authority. Congressional objections may
not be dispositive, but neither should they be ignored. They should
matter not just in an assessment of the policy wisdom of a treaty
termination but also as a matter of constitutional construction.
D. The Scope of Federal Preemption
The Youngstown canon may also be relevant to determining the
preemptive scope of federal law. In cases about the scope of federal

306. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
307. Id. at 195; see Koh, Presidential Power, supra note 266, at 445 (“Under Zivotofsky I’s
narrowed two-pronged political question test, treaty termination is not a political question.”).
Standing would remain an additional, though perhaps surmountable, hurdle.
308. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
309. See Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 195 (discussing the first two Baker factors).
310. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
311. Cf. Harlan Grant Cohen, A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, 49 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1, 13 (2017) (“To the extent Justice Rehnquist was applying the Baker factors, he seemed
to be scrunching all six into a ball . . . .”).
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preemption of state law, the Supreme Court has considered the extent
to which the president was acting with the support of Congress and
appears to have expanded the scope of federal preemption on that
basis.312 In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,313 the Court
considered whether federal law preempted a Massachusetts law that
prohibited state agencies from purchasing goods or services from
entities “doing business with Burma” (Myanmar).314 After
Massachusetts passed its law, Congress passed a law that “impos[ed] a
set of mandatory and conditional sanctions on Burma.”315 The law
empowered the president to impose additional sanctions on Burma if
the Burmese government engaged in repression of democratic
opponents,316 instructed him to develop a strategy to promote
democracy and human rights in Burma, and authorized him to waive
the sanctions if their imposition contravened U.S. national security
interests.317 After finding that Burma had “committed large-scale
repression of the democratic opposition,” President Bill Clinton issued
an executive order imposing additional sanctions, prohibiting, among
other things, any new investment in Burma by U.S. persons.318
The National Foreign Trade Council, which represented
businesses covered by the Massachusetts law, sued, claiming that the

312. In earlier work, I argued that the Court’s consideration of congressional objections to
presidential action in determining the preemptive scope of federal law constitutes a reason for
Congress to object to presidential actions with which it disagrees, even if such disagreement does
not directly defeat or halt the actions. See Eichensehr, Conduct of Foreign Relations, supra note
15, at 651 n.195 (arguing that “if Congress and the president disagree, courts may use the
disagreement as a justification for finding a narrower scope for federal preemption, leaving states
with more freedom to act,” and therefore that Congress should “disagree with President Trump—
and . . . do so vocally—on issues like withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement,” because
“[e]ven if Congress’s opposition does not stop the presidential action, it might have the more
indirect effect of shrinking the preemptive scope of federal power to allow state initiatives to
proceed”).
313. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
314. Id. at 367. The country’s government changed its name from “Burma” to “Myanmar” in
1989. See Thomas Fuller, Burma? Myanmar? New Freedom To Debate Includes Name, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 4, 2012), https://nyti.ms/UHE3jO [https://perma.cc/6MSM-UMJD]. I use “Burma”
here for consistency with the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court noted that it uses “Burma,”
as did the lower court, because “both parties and amici curiae, the state law, and the federal law
all do so” and that its “use of this term . . . is not intended to express any political view.” Crosby,
530 U.S. at 366 n.1.
315. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 368.
316. Id. at 369.
317. Id. at 369–70.
318. Id. at 370 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13047, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1998)).
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federal sanctions regime preempted the state law.319 The Supreme
Court agreed. In an opinion by Justice David Souter, the Court held
that the Massachusetts law stood as “an obstacle to the
accomplishment of Congress’s full objectives under the federal Act.”320
The Court focused on the fact that Congress intended “to provide the
President with flexible and effective authority over economic sanctions
against Burma,” empowering him to both increase and decrease the
sanctions in particular circumstances.321 Citing Youngstown’s
description of Category One, the Court noted that “the statute has
placed the President in a position with as much discretion to exercise
economic leverage against Burma, with an eye toward national
security, as our law will admit.”322 The Court concluded that “it is just
this plenitude of Executive authority that we think controls the issue of
preemption here,”323 and required the Massachusetts law, which
reached more broadly than the federal sanctions, to yield.324 Otherwise,
the Massachusetts law would “undermine[] the President’s intended
statutory authority by making it impossible for him to restrain fully the
coercive power of the national economy when he may choose to take
the discretionary action open to him.”325
Again citing Youngstown Category One, the Court also held that
the Massachusetts statute was an obstacle to the federal sanctions law
because it impeded the president’s ability to fulfill Congress’s directive
to cooperate with other countries in a strategy to advance democracy
in Burma.326 The Court explained that “Congress’s express command
to the President to take the initiative for the United States among the
international community invested him with the maximum authority of
the National Government in harmony with the President’s own
constitutional powers.”327 This addition by Congress of its power to that
319. Id. at 370–71.
320. Id. at 373.
321. Id. at 374.
322. Id. at 375–76.
323. Id. at 376.
324. Id. at 376–77.
325. Id. at 377. The Court also cited the fact that the Massachusetts law stood as an obstacle
to the federal sanctions by interfering with Congress’s intent “to limit economic pressure against
the Burmese Government to a specific range” and instead reaching considerably more broadly.
Id. at 377–79.
326. Id. at 380.
327. Id. at 381 (citations omitted) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel
Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)).
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of the president, the Court explained, “belies any suggestion that
Congress intended the President’s effective voice to be obscured by
state or local action.”328
The Court’s strong suggestion in these two holdings is that the fact
that the president was in Youngstown Category One, acting pursuant
to express authorization by Congress, caused the Court to interpret the
preemptive scope of the federal statute relatively broadly. Of course,
having the president in Youngstown Category One is not a prerequisite
for presidential action to preempt state law; the president’s
independent constitutional authorities, particularly with respect to
foreign relations, are sometimes sufficient to displace state law.329
Nonetheless, the Court in Crosby treated Congress’s authorization of
the president’s actions as a plus factor in determining the federal
sanctions’ preemptive scope. Having crossed the bridge of considering
the horizontal allocation of powers among branches of the federal
government in a case about the vertical allocation of powers between
the federal government and the states, it is only a small step from
considering congressional authorization of presidential action to
considering congressional opposition to presidential action in a similar
circumstance.
Take a hypothetical case in which the president seeks
congressional support for a particular action that would preempt state
laws, and Congress instead passes a bill prohibiting the president from
taking the suggested action and expressing support for state initiatives
in the area. The president then vetoes the bill and takes executive
action on his own authority, claiming his constitutional powers
standing alone are sufficient to support the action. When a court
adjudicates the preemptive scope of the president’s action, it might
hold that the president lacks all power to act independent of Congress.
But if, instead, the court believes the president has some power, what
is it to make of Congress’s passage of a prohibition on the president’s
action? The Youngstown canon instructs that, just as the Supreme

328. Id.
329. Cf. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 n.14 (2003) (explaining that although
“[i]t is true that the President in this case is acting without express congressional authority, and
thus does not have the ‘plenitude of Executive authority’ that ‘controll[ed] the issue of
preemption’ in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 376 (2000),” the Court in
Crosby was “careful to note that the President possesses considerable independent constitutional
authority to act on behalf of the United States on international issues . . . and conflict with the
exercise of that authority is a comparably good reason to find preemption of state law” (internal
citation omitted)).
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Court in Crosby looked to Congress’s authorization of presidential
action as a plus in construing the preemptive scope of federal law, the
court in the hypothetical should take into account Congress’s
opposition to narrow the preemptive scope of the president’s action.
The difference in the two scenarios, of course, is that in Crosby the
congressional action was perfected into law, whereas in the
hypothetical, Congress failed to override the president’s veto,
rendering Congress’s prohibitory bill not law. This is a significant
difference. But even so, the congressional action in both cases is the
same: passage by a majority vote of both houses. The difference is the
approval (or lack thereof) of the president. What the Court relied on
in Crosby was Congress’s view of the president’s authority. Such views
are not—and need not be—expressed only via enacted law, which
necessarily depends on the views of the president as well. If, as Crosby
suggests, what is relevant to a court’s analysis of the unsettled questions
about the scope of the federal government’s power vis-à-vis states is
the views of Congress—a co-equal branch of the federal government,
and the one designed to reflect and respect states’ interests—then the
president’s views should not be determinative. Rather, when the
underlying constitutional allocation of power between the federal
government and the states is unclear, courts should take into account
Congress’s views of the scope of federal power, even where such views
conflict with those of the executive.
When considering the scope of federal power to preempt state
action, courts should consider congressional agreement or
disagreement with the executive action doing the putative preempting.
Doing so appropriately shades the constitutional inquiry based on the
views of the branch of the federal government designed to protect
states’ interests and avoids entirely ceding the field to the executive,
the branch designed to favor federal power.
*

*

*

These examples illustrate some of the different ways the
Youngstown canon of construction can apply. In some circumstances,
the canon counsels in favor of narrowly construing a prior ambiguous
statutory authorization in light of subsequent congressional attempts
to limit the authorization’s scope, deny its application to particular
facts, or repeal it entirely. The AUMF, NEA, and preemption
examples best demonstrate these statute-focused approaches. In other
cases, the fact of congressional objection to presidential action, as

EICHENSEHR IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1314

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/23/2021 9:06 PM

[Vol. 70:1245

evidenced by a vetoed bill, functions as an input into assessing the
boundaries of shared constitutional power. In these constitutionally
focused cases, vetoed bills can show nonacquiescence by Congress to
broad claims of executive power or disrupt executive claims that there
is an unbroken practice as required for historical gloss arguments.
There, the Youngstown canon counsels in favor of narrowly construing
the ambiguous constitutional authority the executive claims in a
manner akin to constitutional avoidance. The examples of treaty
termination and war powers based on the president’s Article II
authority best illustrate these types of application of the canon.
Stepping back from particular applications shows that judges and other
interpreters can deploy the Youngstown canon, like many canons, in a
variety of ways to suit differing interpretive contexts and approaches.
III. CONCERNS AND CONSEQUENCES
This Part addresses several possible concerns with and
consequences of adopting the Youngstown canon. It concludes by
addressing the incentives the canon creates for Congress.
A. Cheap Talk and Symbolic Voting
One possible concern with the Youngstown canon is that it gives
interpretive weight to actions that Congress intended to be cheap talk
or symbolic voting. One might argue that legislators did not intend
vetoed bills and joint resolutions to be taken seriously and would not
have passed them but for the fact that they knew the president would
veto them. The bills and resolutions, the argument goes, were meant to
be symbolic rebukes of the president, but nothing more, so it would be
inconsistent with Congress’s intent to give the congressional actions
interpretive weight.
This argument depends on a number of assumptions, which do not
necessarily hold. First, vetoed bills and resolutions aren’t really cheap.
The cost of vetoed bills or resolutions can be considered at the level of
the institution or at the level of individual legislators. With respect to
Congress as an institution, the vetoed bills and resolutions have
potentially significant opportunity costs. They take time and effort that
could be devoted to other legislative priorities.330 They are also costly

330. Cf. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 589 (making the point about simple and
concurrent resolutions that “[p]assing resolutions is costly: it takes time that could be used for
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for individual legislators, who must (one hopes, at least) spend time
learning about and considering the bill or resolution—time the
legislators could have spent on other legislative efforts, constituent
services, fundraising, or campaigning.331 Legislative leaders or other
proponents of the bill or resolution might also incur costs through log
rolls or horse trades in the process of negotiating for other legislators’
affirmative votes. Marginal voters may in fact be among the most
invested in the process of passage—not because of what it costs them
to get the bill passed, but because of what they stand to gain in
exchange for their affirmative votes.
Yet another type of cost associated with vetoed bills comes from
the layering on of party politics.332 Passage of a bill that the president
ultimately vetoes may be an especially credible signal of congressional
commitment when the same party controls the presidency and one or
both houses of Congress.333 There, congressional votes cannot be
dismissed as mere party politics posturing because they reveal a
divergence among members of the same party. This was the case with
the Yemen, Iran, and southern border resolutions discussed above.
The Republican-controlled Senate passed them, and the Republican
Trump administration vetoed them.334 Where a veto comes in response
other things,” such as “passing legislation”). Gersen and Posner argue, “it is incorrect to say that
the simple resolution is cheap talk and therefore not credible; it entails some positive cost less
than the cost of enacting a statute but more than the cost of a legislative speech.” Id. at 597. The
joint resolutions and other bills that this paper addresses are statutes-in-waiting, so to the extent
that the arguments that simple and concurrent resolutions are costly are persuasive, they are even
more true for the bills and joint resolutions that this Article addresses.
331. Cf. id. at 589 (noting that passing soft law instruments takes time away from “engaging
in constituent service, meeting supporters, enjoying leisure”—activities that “benefit members of
Congress either directly or by improving their chances for reelection”).
332. See supra notes 126–29 and accompanying text (discussing how bipartisan congressional
opposition to a president may strengthen the case for applying the Youngstown canon).
333. In assessing historical gloss on executive power, the executive branch itself has cited
concurrence in the practice by presidents of different political parties as a point in favor of the
existence of a presidential power. See Deployment of U.S. Armed Forced into Haiti, supra note
221, at 178 (“Such a pattern of executive conduct, made under claim of right, extended over many
decades and engaged in by Presidents of both parties, ‘evidences the existence of broad
constitutional power.’” (quoting Presidential Power To Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without
Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 187 (1980))). Similarly, bipartisan disagreement with
a president’s claim of power might be particularly persuasive evidence of its nonexistence.
334. Cf. Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some Lessons from
Hamdan, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1451, 1467 (2007) (noting that with “unified government with parties
that are coalitions” the president can lose because “there is some chance that the minority party
may be able to pull away enough members of the President’s (coalitional) party for the minority
party to prevail on specific issues”).
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to an action by a Congress or a house of Congress that is controlled by
the same party as the president, the bill might be understood to signal
a particularly credible commitment by Congress—one worth splitting
a political party and incurring some political ramifications.335
A second assumption built into the cheap talk concern is that
legislators know with certainty that the president will veto a bill or joint
resolution. And that is not always the case. Many presidents have
declined to veto bills with which they have concerns, even
constitutional concerns, in favor of issuing a signing statement setting
out constitutional objections and declining to enforce particular
portions of bills.336 Such a move might be particularly likely if Congress
bundles the provisions to which the president objects into must-pass
legislation, like defense funding bills or budget bills. In other words,
what may in retrospect, after a presidential veto, look like
congressional cheap talk or symbolic voting may very well have been
less clearly so ex ante.
B. Notice and Retroactive Applicability
A second possible concern with adoption of the Youngstown
canon might stem from lack of notice to Congress that vetoed bills and
resolutions would be used as interpretive aids. On this rationale, and
related to the cheap talk point above, Congress may not have passed
vetoed bills if it had known that such bills would be used to construe
constitutional or statutory powers. Thus, applying the canon to bills or
resolutions passed and vetoed before the canon’s adoption would
unfairly surprise Congress or fail to reflect congressional intent.
This concern reaches more broadly than the Youngstown canon to
all canons that courts announce and apply retroactively.337 And the

335. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 15, at 2352 (explaining that under unified government,
“[f]or Congress to respond to executive initiatives is to give the opposition party an opportunity
to call into question, criticize, or potentially embarrass the President” and “run the risk that
unpleasant facts will be revealed in congressional deliberations or that blame for failures will fall
on the party as a whole”).
336. For an overview of recent presidential uses of signing statements, including to raise
constitutional objections, see generally TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33667,
PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
(2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5YK-SRYD].
337. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, The New Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 133 HARV.
L. REV. 1582, 1584 (2020) (noting that “[t]he retroactive application of changed canons to statutes
enacted before the changes may result in interpretations that are different from the ones the
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Supreme Court creates or alters and then retroactively applies canons
and other interpretive rules with some frequency.338 To take just one
example, when the Court announced the federalism canon in Gregory
v. Ashcroft339 in 1991, it applied the canon to construe the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act as amended in 1974.340 In any such
circumstance, one could argue that Congress did not have fair notice
of how the courts would interpret its work and might have acted
differently if it had.
In the case of the Youngstown canon, however, the concern has
less force. The canon effectively gives Congress at least a fraction of
what its actions suggest that it wants. The Youngstown canon takes
Congress at its word that it sought to make law—despite being
thwarted by the presidential veto—and gives it something less, but still
something, in the form of interpretive consideration. The Youngstown
canon should be less of a surprise to Congress and would afford more
respect to the legislature as an institution than other canons, like clear
statement rules, that the Supreme Court creates or alters in ways that
often appear to thwart congressional intent.341

enacting Congresses would have expected” and that “[t]his problem has received little
attention”).
338. See, e.g., id. at 1589–1614 (tracing the significant changes over time in the presumption
against extraterritoriality); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 87, at 619 (explaining that in the 1980s,
the Supreme Court “not only created new canons reflecting federalism-based values, but also
transformed some of the existing clear statement rules into super-strong clear statement rules”);
id. at 619–29 (tracing the evolution of various federalism-related canons throughout the 1980s).
339. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
340. See id. at 464–65 (discussing an amendment to the statute); id. at 470 (explaining that
absent a “plain statement” by Congress, the Court “will not attribute to Congress an intent to
intrude on state governmental functions”). For an additional example in a similar vein, see
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242–46 (1985), which holds that “Congress must
express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the
statute itself” and applies this super-strong clear statement rule against abrogation of state
sovereign immunity to a statute amended in relevant part seven years earlier.
341. One could cite numerous examples where Congress legislates to accomplish something
under existing interpretive rules, only to have the Supreme Court later alter its rules and apply
them retroactively, sending Congress back to the drawing board to try again to accomplish what
it thought it did in the first statute. This issue seems particularly acute when Congress transforms
a regular presumption into a clear statement rule or a clear statement rule into a super-strong
clear statement rule. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 280–82 (1994) (chronicling how, in drafting Title VII, Congress relied on the
Supreme Court’s characterization of the presumption against extraterritoriality as a presumption,
only to have the Court in a later case (EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S.
244 (1991)) transform the presumption into a clear statement rule and hold that the preexisting
statute did not satisfy the new rule); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 87, at 638 (criticizing the
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C. Effects of Canon Adoption on Congressional Action
A final potential concern or at least curiosity is the flip side of the
concern about springing a canon on Congress: What will Congress do
after courts and other interpreters adopt the Youngstown canon? Will
the canon lead Congress to attempt to pass, and have vetoed, more bills
and joint resolutions or fewer? This is an empirical question that
cannot be answered definitively at this point. But it is possible to
hypothesize different results.
If the cheap talk critique discussed above is correct, the canon
could result in fewer attempts by Congress to restrain the president.
Along these lines, vetoed bills are currently simply symbolic actions by
Congress, and once senators and representatives realize that their
supposed cheap talk might have interpretive consequences, they will
cease putting forth bills in this vein that the president will veto. As
explained above, I am skeptical of the premises underlying the
symbolic voting hypothesis, and so I am also skeptical that the canon
would cause a decrease in vetoed bills. But it’s possible.
At the opposite extreme, perhaps the canon will incentivize more
attempts by Congress to push back against or restrain the president,
despite the likelihood of presidential vetoes. On this logic, Congress is
currently insufficiently incentivized to attempt such actions because of
the veto threat and the understanding that vetoed bills are effectively
nullities. Why expend time and resources to pass something that will
come to naught? If that is true, then adopting the canon could realign
congressional incentives in favor of attempting to push back against or
restrain the president more often. The canon counsels that despite a
presidential veto, Congress may get some bang for its buck by having
majoritarian opposition taken into account in interpreting an
ambiguous constitutional or statutory authority.342

Court’s revision of the presumption against extraterritoriality into a clear statement rule in
Aramco as “strongly countermajoritarian” because it frustrated apparent congressional intent
about the scope of Title VII’s application); see also id. at 639 (noting that the Court’s creation and
application of a super-strong clear statement rule with respect to abrogation of state’s immunity
pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment was “extraordinarily countermajoritarian” and that it
“took Congress three statutes and fifteen years to accomplish what Congress probably thought it
had done in 1975” when it initially passed the statute at issue).
342. Cf. Gersen & Posner, supra note 21, at 612 (arguing with respect to simple and
concurrent resolutions that “[g]iven that courts rarely permit Congress to offer interpretations of
earlier statutes by passing resolutions, there is no reason for Congress to enact them,” but “[i]f
judicial practice changed, congressional behavior would likely shift as well”).
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Rounding out the potential effects of the Youngstown canon on
congressional behavior is the possibility that adopting the canon would
have . . . no effect. In their seminal study of congressional knowledge
of canons of statutory interpretation, Gluck and Bressman show that
there is wide variance in congressional staffers’ knowledge about
different canons, by name or by concept.343 This lack of knowledge
extends to such venerable canons as the rule of lenity.344 The same fate
could befall the Youngstown canon, in which case it would have no
effect on Congress’s behavior. On the other hand, Gluck and
Bressman’s study reveals that congressional staffers are very familiar
with the federalism canon and the presumption against
preemption345—both of which are, like the Youngstown canon, aimed
at protecting structural constitutional values. Gluck and Bressman cite
this finding as “the first evidence that some kind of courts-Congress
interpretive feedback loop does exist, at least with respect to certain
interpretive rules,” and that “[k]nowing that the courts consider these
federalism presumptions . . . has an effect both on the substance of
statutes and on how that substance is expressed.”346 These findings may
suggest that interpretive principles related to structural constitutional
issues are comparatively high-salience for Congress and thus more
likely than many interpretive principles to affect congressional
behavior.
Although it is impossible to determine ex ante how or if Congress
would react to adoption of the Youngstown canon, one thing the canon
could do is remove a possible disincentive for Congress to attempt to
act via legislation. Scholars have previously argued for considering soft
law, especially simple and concurrent resolutions, as interpretive aids,
but they have not discussed or considered vetoed bills in a similar
context.347 By showing the equivalence or even superiority of vetoed
bills to other forms of congressional soft law, this Article aims to
343. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 53, at 927–29; see also Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S.
Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575,
614–15 (2002) (concluding, based on a study of the Senate Judiciary Committee, that “canons of
statutory construction are not systematically a central part of the drafting enterprise in which
staffers participate, nor, for that matter, is interpretive research more generally”).
344. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 53, at 946–47.
345. Id. at 942 (reporting that “[a]pproximately 80% of . . . respondents . . . were familiar with
one of these rules by name and approximately 50% said they were familiar with both,” and noting
that “[o]f . . . respondents who were familiar with at least one of these presumptions, 65% said
that at least one played a role when drafting”).
346. Id. (emphasis omitted).
347. See supra notes 98–104 and accompanying text (discussing prior scholarship on soft law).
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decrease the incentives for Congress to attempt to push back against
the executive via only non-binding resolutions when a potentially
binding mechanism of a bill or a joint resolution is available. To the
extent that congressional drafters might have perceived that courts or
other interpreters would give greater weight to concurrent resolutions
than to vetoed bills or joint resolutions, this Article levels the playing
field and provides a roadmap for ensuring that Congress’s views are
considered, even if the president exercises a veto.
CONCLUSION
Although Youngstown is a canonical case, it is not yet a canon of
construction. But it should be. After decades of drift in power toward
the executive, helped along by the courts, the time has come for at least
a modest rebalancing. The proposed Youngstown canon rewards
Congress for overcoming structural and political hurdles to assert its
institutional prerogatives. It respects existing Supreme Court
precedents. And it gives judges, executive branch lawyers, and other
interpreters a clear roadmap for taking into account democratically
legitimate, majoritarian action by the legislative branch.

